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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the Scandinavian stock market’s response to all credit 
rating updates on unsecured debt in listed firms given by Standard & Poor’s and 
Moody’s during the period 2000 to 2010.  We use an event study methodology1 in 
order to reveal any relationship between a credit rating update and stock prices in 
terms of abnormal returns. We find significant abnormal stock returns 
surrounding negative rating updates, Downgrades and negative Credit Watches. 
Conversely, we find virtually no significant effects surrounding positive rating 
updates. These findings are consistent with earlier research in other regions. By 
defining narrow hypotheses we also find differences in announcement effect 
dependent on observable contrasting attributes. Finally we conclude that the credit 
rating agencies do provide the Scandinavian market with new information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 The event stduy is based on MacKinlay, A.C., 1997. Event Studies in Economics and Finance. 
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1- Introduction 
Credit rating agencies (CRA) have recently attracted attention concerning their 
role in the financial markets2. The designated task of the CRAs is to give an 
independent analysis of each company’s credit quality and debt in order to rank 
the companies relative to each other3. Do the agencies perform this task, and 
solely this task? Are CRAs messengers or a source of new information for the 
investor? We want to investigate this subject in the Scandinavian stock market, a 
relatively small but also liquid market4. While the effects of CRAs have been 
thoroughly examined in markets like the US and UK, few studies have been 
performed in this field in Scandinavia. Based on earlier research in other regions, 
we expect credit ratings to have an influence on stock prices. If this is true for the 
Scandinavian market, we aim to find out to what extent and where the influence 
will be present. Our main research question is hereby:  
 
“How accurate are the credit rating agencies in their evaluation of 
companies and do they provide the market with new information?”. 
Further, “If a rating update affect stock price: is the effect sustainable or 
only short-term? Do the pre-announcement tools implemented by the 
credit rating agencies reduce the information asymmetry, and as such, 
reduce announcement effects? Does debt and/or risk level of issuer affect 
the magnitude of an announcement effect?” Finally, “To which extent 
does the announcement effect depend on the credit rating agency 
releasing the rating update?”. 
 
Based on our research questions, we have conducted several analyses and tests 
using an event study approach by MacKinlay (1997). Our working sample 
consists of all types of rating updates given by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
from 2000 to 2010 and are tested on stock prices from all rated companies listed 
on the Scandinavian market.  We found significant negative abnormal returns 
associated with negative news, but no significant positive effect related to positive 
news, which is consistent with previous research. We also found significantly 
different effects concerning Downgrades, after separating companies with regard 
                                                
2 Becker, B. and Milbourn T., (2011) and Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, (2012) 
3 See section 3 – The rating process 
4 See table 5.1.1 for comparison of different stock markets.  
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to level of debt. Further, after testing differences between the two CRAs we found 
some distinctions under given circumstances.  At last, we tested the pre-
announcement tools: Outlook and Credit Watches. We found that they do work as 
intended, as rating updates show no significant effect when preceded by an 
Outlook or Credit Watch.  
 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) conclude that there are significant abnormal negative 
returns following Downgrades. They studied a large database with essentially all 
of Moody’s rating updates in the period 1970-1997 (US). Elayan, Hsu and Meyer 
(2003) search for announcement effects from credit ratings in New Zealand, a 
small market with low liquidity. In addition to significant effects surrounding 
Downgrades, they also found positive effects following Upgrades. This was 
surprising because the majority of recent research only show significant effects 
following Downgrades. These results validated the purpose of their research 
paper, as the intention was to see if effects from credit rating updates differ in 
dissimilar market types. This purpose is also applicable to our thesis.  
 
Ideally, CRAs should evaluate companies based on all public information in the 
market. Thus, according to the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis a rating 
update should not have a significant effect on stock prices, although several 
research papers suggest otherwise. Earlier research’s findings differ together with 
size of the market tested, liquidity of the market, company’s initial credit-quality, 
methodology and data period. If our results show announcement effects related to 
credit rating updates, this suggests that the CRAs performs a task that is beyond 
their designated purpose. This would be interesting for market participants such as 
brokers, investors and analysts, as it indicates that the credit ratings provide new 
valuable information to the market. Such additional information could be 
explained by expertise in the CRAs’ analyses and/or unveiling of non-public 
information.  
 
The CRAs are known to use different methodologies when determining a credit 
rating. Our thesis will contribute to this issue by studying the potential differences 
in magnitude of a rating given by Standard & Poor’s versus a rating given by 
Moody’s. Additionally, we will perform tests on Affirmations, Confirmations and 
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Credit Watch updates, not only down- and Upgrades5.  This gives us a wider set 
of data to test, and makes it possible to test for a variety of effects. Our study of 
stock price effects following credit rating updates distinguishes itself from earlier 
studies with five particular features: 
 
(i) Unique data set, with regard to region and time period. 
(ii) Investigates all types of rating update categories from the CRAs. 
(iii) Investigates differences in announcement effect between ratings from 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. 
(iv) Investigates whether debt and/or risk level in companies affect 
magnitude of announcement effect following credit ratings. 
(v) Investigates if the implementation of the pre-announcement tools 
Credit Watch and Outlook narrows the information asymmetry gap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 See table 5.2.2 for a complete list with explanations of the different rating categories. 
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2- Literature Review 
2.1 Literature review 
It has been conducted a large amount of research regarding credit ratings and their 
impact on stock and bond prices. These have mainly been done in the US Market, 
followed up by studies in countries such as UK, Australia and Japan. The research 
has investigated the CRAs ability to provide superior analytical skills or possibly 
reveal non-public information. In this section we will review important studies 
regarding our topic and accentuate the insights they provide. 
Elayan, Maris and Young (1996) declare that there are two common 
understandings regarding the CRAs role and influence. The first and original view 
is that the agencies only access public information and is simply an information 
processer, interpreting the credit quality of companies, without adding any non-
public information or expertise in the analyses. The second view directly 
challenge the first view by implying that the credit ratings reveal the real credit 
quality, with highly skilled analyses based on information not fully available to 
the public. Research studies that find no significant abnormal returns around 
rating announcements supports the first view, but tend to be a rare result in recent 
research. Studies that find a significant relationship between credit rating updates 
and stock prices supports the second view, and are the typical result in research 
performed in the last three decades.  
Hsueh and Kidwell (1988) state that the value in credit ratings for the issuer is 
reducing the information asymmetry between issuer and investor. Being rated by 
two different agencies (i.e. both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s) reduces the 
uncertainty even more. Hence, investors can use credit ratings to learn the credit 
quality of bonds. Hsueh and Kidwell (1988) also find that the issuer would be able 
to reduce its borrowing cost since the value of being rated would excess the cost 
of obtaining the ratings. The value is created by this sequence of events: Being 
rated à Reduced information asymmetry à Borrowing costs decreased à cost of 
capital decreased à More projects accepted à Market value increased. This 
effect will be static as long as the company keeps being rated, continuously 
maintaining the companies borrowing costs at a lower level than they would be 
without ratings. The possible stock price effect of a lower borrowing cost will 
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therefore not be investigated in this thesis; intuitively it will not interfere with our 
analysis because this “certification effect” appears to be static over time.  
Danos, Holt and Imhoff (1984) argue and prove that the CRAs regularly review 
and investigate the issuer’s confidential forecasts for both new and on-going bond 
issues, and in addition hold expert abilities to evaluate a company’s financial 
situation. This implies that the CRAs are able to provide new information to the 
market, which in turn could result in announcement effects surrounding credit 
rating updates. 
The general findings in earlier research tend to be that amongst the different rating 
types, only Downgrades have a statistical significant effect on stock prices. A 
generally accepted reason for this is that the CRAs are more responsive to 
negative information, leading to Downgrades, than positive news6. Higher 
responsiveness leads to more accurate timing, and thus Downgrades contains 
more new information than Upgrades. It is argued that the CRAs are more 
responsive to negative news because they consider it more important to be in time 
with a Downgrade than with an Upgrade. This is because a too high rating is 
thought to be a more serious misjudgement than a too low rating, due to the nature 
of the consequences. Hypothetically, if a company with a relatively safe rating 
appears to be unsafe and defaults, the rating agency could be accused of being 
misleading and inaccurate, and thus indirectly being held responsible for 
investors’ loss. Inversely, if a company is rated worse than reality actually is, it 
could not lead to a serious event such as a default, and naturally leads to a 
comparatively lower responsibility for the rating agency.  
An older study by Pinches and Singleton (1978), performed on data from years 
1950-1972, shows no significant reaction in stock prices from rating changes. 
Intuitively this means that the investors/market have already determined the 
quality of credit for different companies/bonds, and the credit rating update is in 
reality a still picture of how the market perceives the financial situation. This also 
implies that the CRAs in this sample did not have significantly superior analytical 
skills or private information. This is unlike newer studies, where the majority of 
                                                
6 Altman and Rijken, (2005) 
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researches show at least some significant effect7. Note that this study applied 
monthly instead of daily data on stock prices, which is not sufficient to capture 
short-term effects from rating changes. 
Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), using monthly data from 1953-1975, find 
significant abnormal positive returns in the 11 months preceding a rating Upgrade. 
This implies that the reason for an Upgrade reaches the market before the actual 
Upgrade, as they did not find abnormal returns post rating. With Downgrades, 
they found significant effect on stock prices after the announcement. While this 
study also used monthly data, they criticised the study by Pinches and Singleton 
(1978) for using inadequate methodology and argue that this might be the reason 
for the opposing findings. The findings of Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) are 
comparable to more recent research, in terms of timing theory; the CRAs are 
timelier when declaring a Downgrade than an Upgrade. Thus, while an Upgrade is 
being incorporated in the market before the announcement, a Downgrade shows 
significant post-effect and indicates that the market extracts information from the 
announcement.  
Barron, Clare and Thomas (1997) inspect the effects of ratings and CreditWatch 
announcements from Standard & Poor’s in the UK market using daily data in the 
period 1984-1992. At the time it was a unique study since it was examining a non-
US market. The results replicated the general results from the US studies; they 
found significant negative effect following Downgrades. Additionally, they found 
positive abnormal stock price effect from positive CreditWatch additions. This 
was unexpected based on earlier research, where abnormal returns following a 
positive announcement have been absent. This finding strengthens the purpose of 
doing research on this topic in different markets as results may vary.  
Gropp and Richards (2001) add that size and direction of the impact from a 
Downgrade is dependant on the underlying reason for the Downgrade. They 
investigated European banks in the period 1989-2000. Specifically, they found 
that rating changes as a result of negative changes in earning outlooks is followed 
by strong negative abnormal returns, while rating changes caused by an increase 
in volatility is followed by positive abnormal returns. Gropp and Richards (2001) 
                                                
7 Barron, Clare and Thomas (1997), Gropp and Richards (2001), Dichev and Piotroski (2001) and 
Elayan, Hsu and Meyer (2003) are examples of later articles that find significant abnormal returns 
surrounding a credit rating update.  
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also state that rating agencies perform a valuable role in particular for 
stockholders, by procuring and summarising non-public information.  
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) find abnormal returns after Downgrades, but also 
connected to the announcements of additions for Standard & Poor’s Credit Watch 
list, given that the addition indicates either an Upgrade or a Downgrade. These 
Credit Watch additions also have the ability to build anticipation around a coming 
rating update, as they are designed to indicate the outcome. Hence, the Credit 
Watch updates could potentially contain even more information and/or impact the 
market more than the ratings, as there are no preliminary forecasts preparing the 
market for a Credit Watch update. The study also investigates the issue of 
contaminating news surrounding the announcement date; they find approximately 
the same results in the non-contaminated sample as in the contaminated sample. 
This implies that it is possible to search for effects following rating updates 
without filtering out “contaminated” rating updates. 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) study the long-run stock returns following bond-
rating changes using an extensive database with essentially all of Moody’s rating 
changes in the US between 1970 and 1997. They prove significant excess returns 
following Downgrades, with a stronger effect appearing with the small low credit-
quality companies. An interesting aspect to note from their research is that the 
effect found was not necessarily a direct reaction from the Downgrade, but rather 
occurring in connection with the subsequent earnings announcement. This is 
actually a sign of underreaction from investors following the credit rating 
announcement, as the Downgrade actually predicted the negative earnings 
announcement while investors did not react fully until it took place. Based on 
Dichev and Piotroski’s research, it is sensible to say that a downgrade somewhat 
predicts that the stock price will fall.  
Elayan, Hsu and Meyer (2003) test the effects of credit rating changes in a smaller 
economy with less liquidity and less analysed markets, and thus a limited level of 
information. They investigate the financial market in New Zealand, which has a 
large usage of credit ratings relatively to the market’s size, in the period 1990-
2000. They find interesting results that contradict studies from US and Australia. 
In addition to a significant effect from Downgrades and CreditWatch 
announcements, they also find significant positive effects from rating Upgrades. 
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This increases the information-provider and analytical role of the CRAs in certain 
smaller markets. They also find positive significant effect from the announcement 
of attaining a credit rating itself, leading to an indication of a value-adding effect 
of being rated by reducing uncertainty surrounding the credit quality of a 
company (also called the “certification effect”). This study is highly relevant for 
our thesis, as it has investigated a smaller sized economy. Although the 
Scandinavian economy differs from New Zealand in a number of aspects, they are 
both smaller and less researched on this topic than the major international 
markets.  
Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012) investigate several issues concerning conflict 
of interest for the CRAs. They mainly find that competition amongst CRAs may 
reduce efficiency, because CRAs may understate credit risk to attract issuers. 
After all, it is the issuers that are the source of income for CRAs. Additionally, 
they state that companies allegedly perform “rating shopping”, meaning that they 
tend to not publish unfavourable ratings. As a credit rating is charged only if made 
public, this suggests an incentive for the CRAs to compete in issuing the “better 
rating”, leading to underestimation of credit risk. A consequence of this 
phenomenon could naturally become that positive rating updates are less credible 
than negative rating updates, as positive updates may be seen as a way for the 
CRA to satisfy the issuer. 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
In this section we will briefly go through relevant theories related to our thesis in 
order to explain the existence, or absence, of a relationship between credit rating 
announcement and stock return reaction. 
Market efficiency hypothesis: 
Strong market efficiency hypothesis require that all private and public information 
are incorporated in a given stock price. In reality, excess returns from trading 
based on private (inside) information is observed, thus this requirement is 
generally violated. If we find abnormal stock returns related to a credit rating 
update, it could partly be explained by non-public information being revealed to 
the CRA by the rated company, indicating that new valuable information are 
being exposed to the market. If this is the case, the market is said to be semi-
strong efficient (potentially weak form).  
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Assuming the market is semi-strong efficient, the announcement effect from credit 
ratings can possibly be explained by three hypotheses: 1) the information content 
hypothesis, 2) the wealth redistribution hypothesis and 3) the signalling 
hypothesis.  
1. The information content hypothesis 
Zaima, J.K. and McCarthy, J., (1988) suggest that there is information 
asymmetry between the credit rating agency and the market resulting in 
valuable information being disclosed during a credit rating update.  
Information gathering is costly and it is obvious that the CRAs benefit 
from an economy of scale and therefore gather the information more 
efficiently. In turn this leads to a greater availability of information not 
fully disclosed to the public. This statement is challenged by another 
research paper by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), which state that CRAs 
do not monitor companies closely and that a credit rating update is rather 
dependent on changes in debt structure.  
 
2. The wealth redistribution hypothesis  
This hypothesis suggests that there is a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and bondholders. For instance, if a bond is downgraded due 
to an increase in risk because of higher leverage and the market anticipates 
this, then the outstanding value of the bond will fall and some of this value 
(wealth) will be transferred to the stockholders. Based on this hypothesis 
Goh and Ederington (1993) argues that a Downgrade is not always bad 
news for stockholders.  
 
3. The signalling hypothesis 
The signalling hypothesis is based on the view that an updated credit 
rating should signal assumptions regarding future earnings and cash flows. 
Dependent on the reason for an update, it should reflect the outlook for the 
rated company or for the whole industry. This hypothesis expects the same 
outcome as the information content hypothesis, that an Upgrade 
(Downgrade) is followed by a positive (negative) reaction in the stock 
price.   
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3- The rating process 
CRAs’ intended task is to gather information with regard to a company’s 
creditworthiness and judge their ability to pay their debt. This is accomplished by 
collecting and summarising public information, performing in-depth analyses, and 
possibly assessing private information provided by the issuer. For the issuer, the 
value added by attaining and publishing a credit rating lies in the reduction of 
information asymmetry between the issuer and potential investors and creditors.  
Out of the lot, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s are the main participants in the 
credit rating industry, with global coverage of companies for several decades. 
They are also the only rating agencies with significant market coverage in 
Scandinavia; thus, it was natural to choose Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s when 
selecting rating agencies to investigate for the purpose of our thesis. 
Comparing Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, the objectives of their credit ratings 
have some important differences that should be taken into account. Standard & 
Poor’s credit ratings solely indicate the probability of default of the rated 
company. Moody’s, on the other hand, has a more complex approach when rating 
a company, as they in fact rate not only the probability of default, but rather the 
expected loss; “expected loss is a function of the probability of default and the 
expected severity of loss given a default”8. While Moody’s investigate and 
include how severe the losses given a default would be when giving a rating, 
Standard & Poor’s only concern is the net risk of default.  
Standard & Poor’s emphasise the importance of transparency in their work, and 
publish a detailed “instruction manual” on how they conduct their rating process 
for each particular industry sector. Ratings are based on a balanced weighing 
between qualitative and quantitative analyses. They find it important that market 
participants understand how and why they assign particular credit ratings. 
Moody’s are more reserved concerning their criteria and methodology in the 
rating process, and state that “...we believe that any attempt to reduce credit rating 
to a formulaic methodology would be misleading and would lead to serious 
mistakes”. Moody’s only publish general framework for their rating process, 
                                                
8 Moody’s Investors Service, 2012. 
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which may lead to greater uncertainty surrounding their rating updates. This is 
interesting for us in our thesis as we can test for differences in market reaction 
dependent on whether a rating is published by Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s.   
Besides Downgrades and Upgrades, which are well known due to media coverage, 
there is a considerable amount of other information being communicated through 
the CRAs. In particular, these are Confirmations, Affirmations, Credit Watch 
updates and Outlook additions. Confirmation is a rating that confirms the last 
credit rating given and keeps it unchanged. An Affirmation is not a rating, but 
purely the credit rating agency affirming that the rated company’s credit quality 
has not changed since the last rating. Normally, ratings and Affirmations are 
supplied with an Outlook, which is a general hint on the future course of a rating.  
If a company/rating is placed on positive or negative Credit Watch, it means that a 
rating is under review, and the credit rating agency informs the market of the 
expected direction. As these credit update categories potentially could contain just 
as much information as Downgrades and Upgrades, we have chosen to include 
them in our analyses.  
The issuers are the main source of income for the CRAs, potentially raising a 
conflict of interest that may damage the integrity of the agencies. Implicitly, it is 
easy to believe that ratings historically are tweaked in a positive direction to 
attract issuers. But in turn, too good ratings could cause reduced credibility of the 
agencies for users, and would also appear on comparisons of historical default 
rates and credit ratings. However, this conflict of interest may explain 
announcement effects found in our investigations.  
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4- Hypotheses 
In this section we present our eight hypotheses that will be used to investigate our 
research question. By using these hypotheses in our tests, and possibly rejecting 
their respective null hypotheses, we will be able to analyse and draw conclusions 
regarding our topic. 
4.1 Announcement effect surrounding credit ratings 
Hypothesis 1: Downgrades, negative Credit Watches and negative Affirmations 
have a negative impact on stock returns.    
Hypothesis 2: Upgrades, positive Credit Watches and positive Affirmations have 
a positive impact on stock returns.  
Hypothesis 3: Confirmations (Moody’s only) and New ratings have an impact on 
stock returns. 
In our first three hypotheses we examine every type of update that CRAs are 
providing the market with and how the market responds to different updates. 
These are the fundamental tests of our thesis, which will be used to draw 
conclusions regarding the presence of announcement effects from credit ratings. 
Also, these tests will show us which rating update categories that are interesting to 
test in our remaining hypotheses.  
4.2 Standard & Poor’s versus Moody’s and Low versus High debt and risk level 
Hypothesis 4: The market’s reaction from a credit rating update differs in 
magnitude dependent on whether the rating update is given by Moody’s or 
Standard & Poor’s. 
The objective of our fourth hypothesis is to uncover any preferences the 
Scandinavian market may have towards one of the two CRAs. We will measure if 
the impact from the different credit rating updates on stock prices differs 
dependent on whether the information comes from Moody’s or Standard & 
Poor’s. The different methodologies and level of transparency in rating criteria in 
the two agencies could explain a rejection of the null hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 5: The impact on stock prices from a credit rating update is dependent 
on whether companies’ capital structure consists of high or low debt. 
With our fifth hypothesis we will learn if the level of debt affects the magnitude 
of an announcement effect following a rating update. We will examine if the 
announcement effect from a credit rating update is significantly different between 
companies with high and low debt level. We use the debt-to-equity ratio in order 
to distinguish companies, and define companies with debt-to-equity ratio in 
excess of 1 as a company with high debt. This is tested because a credit rating is 
in reality a rating of the ability for a company to pay their debt, thus, a company 
with higher debt could potentially be more sensible to rating changes.  
Hypothesis 6: The impact on stock prices from a credit rating update is dependent 
on whether the companies have a high or low level of risk (beta). 
The objective of hypothesis six is to uncover any differences between companies 
with high and low risk level. We will use the correlation between companies’ 
return and the return on the market, beta value, calculated from the market model 
in our estimation window9 as a measure of risk. We include the one-third highest 
and lowest beta values in the different rating categories in order to distinguish 
companies with high and low risk level. We believe that companies with high risk 
are more sensitive to rating changes due to potentially higher volatility in the 
stock returns.  
4.3 Market anticipation and sustainability of a credit rating update ‘effect’ 
Hypothesis 7: The effect from Upgrades and Downgrades with previous 
corresponding Outlook/Credit Watch is anticipated by the market and will have 
no impact on stock prices.  
With this hypothesis we will test if anticipated rating updates have smaller impact 
on stock prices. This test will clarify if Credit Watches and Outlook additions are 
successful pre-announcement tools in reducing the information asymmetry by 
increasing the flow of communication to the market participants. This will be 
tested by examining for announcement effects surrounding Upgrades and 
Downgrades with a preceding Outlook or Credit Watch. 
                                                
9 See section 5.4 – Methodology, for explanations 
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Hypothesis 8: The announcement effects from credit rating updates are not 
temporary and will be sustained over time.  
We examine how the market responds to the announcement and measure the 
possible effect from the credit rating updates over time. If we find significant 
effects from the credit ratings surrounding the announcement date, but the effect 
fades away during the upcoming days, we can say that the CRA’s provide non-
sustainable information to the market. It can also be partly explained by the 
market over- or underreacting to the information provided by the CRA’s.  
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5- Data and Methodology 
5.1 Data description 
Our data consist of credit rating updates from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s in 
addition to stock prices from the Scandinavian stock market. Our original sample 
consists of 430 credit rating updates, which include all the different categories of 
credit rating updates that Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s apply.  These ratings 
originate from 49 different companies in Scandinavia that are listed during our 
sample period10; our sample period is from January 2000 through December 2010.  
  
The type of debt used in our sample is long term unsecured, which is consistent 
with what earlier research papers on this topic have used. The main reason for 
using long-term unsecured debt is that the majority of corporate market debt 
consists of long-term bond issues, and unsecured debt has the least complicated 
structure compared to convertible and other similar debt. Also due to availability, 
unsecured debt is the most commonly rated debt type, which enables us to collect 
a sufficient amount of data.  
 
We chose to collect daily stock returns11 in order to focus on a narrow window 
around the rating update and capture the potential short-term effect. We are aware 
that the use of daily data raises the possibility of additional noise in the data 
series12, but are dependent on daily data to distinguish announcement effect 
surrounding the day of a rating update.  
 
Table 5.1.1 
  
                                                
10 We have included literally all companies in the Scandinavian market that have received a rating 
from Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s during our sample period.  
11 Same as Griffin and Sanvicente, 1982, and also the majority of later papers.  
12 Glascock, Davidson and Young, 1987 
Turnover rate (%) Market Cap
Stock Exchange 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average USD Bn.
NYSE 88 94 105 99 105 113 118 123 138 129 98 110 13394
NASDAQ 201 201 203 123 127 129 183 217 404 349 189 211 3889
LSE 67 79 95 102 141 142 124 270 227 146 102 136 3613
HKEX 61 47 42 42 51 44 48 81 123 65 59 60 2711
OMX Stockholm 107 134 122 124 134 124 147 139 152 119 95 127 629
OSEBX 97 86 75 98 110 129 154 153 157 132 125 120 298
OMX Copenhagen 51 55 69 58 68 92 88 89 83 81 62 72 238
NZEX 46 46 38 38 40 40 45 47 88 40 35 46 36
Sources: NYSE Homepage, The World Bank Homepage, Hong Kong Exchange Homepage, NASDAQ Nordic Homepage, Oslo Stock Exchange Homepage
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When comparing the leading stock exchanges of the world with the Scandinavian 
market, we see from table 5.1.1 that the Scandinavian stock exchanges are 
substantially smaller sized in terms of market capitalisation. They are similar 
(apart from Copenhagen, which only accounts for a fifth of the total market cap in 
the Scandinavian stock market) in terms of liquidity (turnover rate).  Assuming 
that asymmetrical information increases with low liquidity, there is no particular 
reason to expect that the level of asymmetrical information in Scandinavia should 
be higher than in the leading stock exchanges. We see that the stock exchange in 
New Zealand is smaller in size and has a lower level of liquidity than both the 
leading exchanges and the Scandinavian market.  
5.2 Data collection 
We have collected all available credit rating updates for companies listed on 
Scandinavian stock exchanges during our time sample. To acquire ratings from 
Moody’s, we matched a list of all publicly traded companies in the Scandinavian 
stock market with Moody’s public database of ratings. Standard & Poor’s do not 
provide a public database of historical ratings like Moody’s, but by contacting 
Standard & Poor’s directly we were able to specify and purchase the rating history 
for our sample period. The distribution of rating updates categorised by country, 
rating agency and rating type are shown in the table below: 
 
Table 5.2.1 
 
 
From table 5.2.1 we can see that the distribution of observations between Sweden 
and Norway are fairly equal, while the amount of observations from Denmark is 
lower. The number of observations from the two CRAs is about the same; 
Moody’s account for 54% and Standard & Poor’s 46%.  
 
Allocation of the different rating types is rather uneven. The most common rating 
update is Downgrade, as 26 % of our observations are Downgrades, followed by 
24% Affirmations (with different Outlooks) and 15% Upgrades. Negative and 
Distribution of credit ratings
Country Agency Downgrades Upgrades Credit Watches Affirmation Confirmation New Total
Sweden Moody's 20 13 17 21 10 2 176
S&P 24 13 13 33 0 10 -
Norway Moody's 19 12 15 20 9 9 166
S&P 26 13 18 22 0 3 -
Denmark Moody's 16 9 21 2 8 8 88
S&P 8 6 3 5 0 2 -
Total 113 66 87 103 27 34 430
Summary'statistic'of''the'orignial'sample'of'430'rating'updates'over'the'period'January'2000'to'January'2010.
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positive Credit Watches sums up to 16% and 5% respectively. New ratings 
account for 8%, while Confirmations (only Moody’s) account for 6%. Below is a 
table describing the different types of rating updates that we have included in our 
thesis13.  
Sources: Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s  
 
Thomson Reuters Datastream, our source for stock prices, provides us with time 
series of stock prices for the relevant companies during our time period adjusted 
for contaminating capital actions. Market indices for Denmark and Sweden, 
Copenhagen KFMX and OMX Stockholm respectively, are also collected from 
Datastream. The Norwegian OSEBX market data are collected directly from the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. 
5.3 Data selection 
Rating data from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s are crosschecked against 
Factiva’s news database in order to confirm the publication dates of the ratings. 
                                                
13 A complete list of all the 430 ratings is presented in appendix 5.2. 
             Table 5.2.2 	  
Credit rating 
Main update from CRA. In-depth evaluation of credit worthiness. A scale of 
letter designations describes the credit quality of a company. Based on thorough 
analysis over time.  
   Downgrade CRA lowers the credit rating of a company, stating a lower level of credit worthiness. 
   Upgrade CRA raises the credit rating of a company, stating a higher level of credit worthiness. 
   Confirmation CRA confirms the credit rating of a company, stating an unchanged level of credit worthiness. 
   New rating CRA releases a credit rating on an unrated company, stating the level of credit worthiness. 
Credit Watch 
A temporary release announcing that the CRA is contemplating a revised credit 
rating in a particular direction. Can be an instant response to news. Always 
followed by a credit rating within the next 8 weeks. 
   Negative CRA informing the market that a Downgrade is being considered. Often used when bad news about the issuer is released. 
   Positive CRA informing the market that an Upgrade is being considered. Often used when good news about the issuer is released.  
Affirmation 
CRA updating the market that a rating is maintained, through a press release 
concerning the company but not necessarily explicitly about the rating. Lowest 
rank of information communicated by CRAs. 
   Negative Outlook An Affirmation with a negative Outlook expresses that the rating is sustained but believed to trend in a negative manner.  
   Positive Outlook An Affirmation with a positive Outlook expresses that the rating is sustained but believed to trend in a positive manner.  
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With the exception of seven observations we could confirm the date of all the 
ratings. The unconfirmed seven observations are deleted from our working 
sample.  
 
From the original data sample of 430 rating updates we had to delete 33 
observations due to missing stock prices and/or market prices within our 
estimation window for the given dates. 26 credit ratings regarding banks were also 
removed from our working sample because of clustering. This clustering is due to 
overall refined rating methodology by Moody’s; leading to sector-wide rating 
changes. 
5.4 Methodology 
The methodology and notation that we use follows the article Event Studies in 
Economics and Finance (1997) by A. Craig MacKinlay. We have, however, made 
a few modifications regarding the notations in order to make it more appropriate 
for our thesis. 
 
Returns will be indexed in event time using notation 𝜏, where 𝜏 = 0 is defined as 
the event date. 𝜏 =   𝑇!+ 1 to 𝜏 =   𝑇! represent the initial event window and 𝜏 =   𝑇! to 𝜏 =   𝑇! constitutes the estimation window. The estimation- and initial 
event window can be written as 𝐿! = 𝑇! − 𝑇! and 𝐿! = 𝑇! − 𝑇!. The additional 
event windows are defined in the area between 𝑇!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑇!.   The timing sequence 
of different windows is illustrated below in Figure 5.4.1.  
 
Figure 5.4.1. MacKinlay (1997) 
 
 
 
 
With aim of measuring the announcement effect from the different rating updates 
on stock prices we will calculate the abnormal return from our sample, both short- 
and long-term. We define the abnormal return (AR), as a return that deviates from 
the otherwise normal return of the stock14, which is calculated by applying the 
market model. Further, we will use the prediction errors from the market model to 
                                                
14 Barron, Clare and Thomas, 1997 
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calculate the potential abnormal returns. We will estimate the market model 
parameters based on an estimation window of 200 days from 𝜏 =- 210 to 𝜏 =-11, 
where 𝜏 =0 is defined as the day of a rating announcement.  
 
To study the potential short- and long-term effects on stock prices from the 
announcement of credit rating updates we will define several event windows. We 
will explore a two-day window, 𝜏 =0 and 𝜏 =+1, in order to measure if there is an 
initial stock price response following a rating announcement. The date 𝜏 +1 will 
be included due to possible press release after the opening hours of the stock 
exchange.  
 
Next, we will construct a pre-announcement window from 𝜏 =-10 to 𝜏 =-1 in 
order to draw conclusions about the development of the companies returns prior to 
an announcement. Further, we will look at the potential short-term effect where 
the event window is defined from 𝜏 =0 to 𝜏 =5 and long term effect with an event 
window from 𝜏 =0 to 𝜏 =45. With help from the two last event windows we will 
examine if the possible effect on stock prices are sustainable (i.e. the effect on 
returns increase/decrease to a given level and stays there), or if the stock price is 
corrected back to its initial level. 
 
Market model: 
Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) applies different methodologies in order to 
calculate normal returns; the two-factor model, portfolio method and the market 
model. The constant mean return model, capital asset pricing model and 
multifactor normal performance models based on arbitrage pricing theory have 
also been commonly used in event studies over the years. However, none of these 
models have turned out to have any significant advantage to the market model, 
which is why we have decided to apply this model.  
 
 𝑅!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑅!" + 𝜀!"    (1) 
 𝐸(𝜀!𝜏 = 0)   var(𝜀!𝜏) = 𝜎!! 
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 𝑅!" = ln  ( !"#$%  !"!"#!!"#$%  !"#$%!!!) and 𝑅!"=  ln  ( !"#$%&  !"#$%!!"#$%&  !"#$%!!!) 
 
Where R!,𝜏   is the continuously compounded return on stock “i” given time “𝜏”, R!,𝜏   is the continuously compounded market return for the given markets, alpha 
the intercept and beta the correlation between return on stock “i” and the market 
return. Under general conditions ordinary least squares (OLS) is a consistent 
estimation procedure for the market model parameters15 and we assume that the 
residual term satisfy the assumptions regarding the OLS regression model. 
  AR!! = R!! − α! − β!R!!               (2) 
 
Where  β! =    (𝑅!" − 𝜇!)(𝑅!" − 𝜇!)!!!!!!!! (𝑅!"!!!!!!!! − 𝜇!)!  
 α! = 𝜇! − β!𝜇! 
 
 
𝜎!!! = 1𝐿! − 2 (R!! − α! − β!R!!)!!!!!!!!!  
and 
𝜇! = 1𝐿! 𝑅!"!!!!!!!!  
 
𝜇! = 1𝐿! 𝑅!"!!!!!!!!  
 
                                                
15 MacKinlay 1997 
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Where τ = T! + 1,… ,T!, is the sample of abnormal returns for company “i” in 
the initial event window, the same applies when calculating the additional event 
windows, but with a different time sample. We obtain the estimates 𝛼 and 𝛽 by 
running OLS regressions on the market model over our estimation period. 
 
Conditional on the event window’s market return, under the null-hypothesis the 
abnormal return is normally distributed with a zero conditional mean and 
conditional variance equal to:  
 𝜎  ! AR!! = 𝜎!!! + !!! 1 + (!!"!!!)!!!!         (3) 
 
From equation (3) above the first component is the disturbance variance: σ!!!  and 
the second element is the additional variance due to sampling error in α! and β!. 
This sampling error leads to serial correlation of the abnormal returns even though 
the true disturbances are independent through time. Having a long estimation 
window, which makes the second term approach zero, solves this problem. Given 
our estimation window of 200 days we can reasonably assume that the 
asymptotically approximations holds, and the variance of AR is consequently 
 𝜎  ! AR!! = 𝜎!!!      (4) 
 
Since we use daily observation of stock prices and therefore can calculate 
abnormal returns on a daily basis, it is possible to summarise the AR across 
different companies, resulting in the cumulative abnormal return: 
 CAR!(!!,!!) = ARi!  !  !!  !!  ! 	  	   	   	   	   (5)	  	  	  	  
Where “𝜏1“ represent the first and “𝜏2“ the last day of the event window, 
conditional upon that 𝜏 =0 is the date of the announcement.   
 
Asymptotically (as 𝐿! increases) the variance of CAR!  (!!,!!) is: 
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σ!! τ!, τ! = τ! − τ! + 1 𝜎!!	   	   	   	   (6) 
 
Next, we average the CAR in any sample (e.g. Upgrades only) to form an average 
prediction of the cumulative abnormal return.   
 ACAR!(!!,!!) = !! CAR!(!!,!!)!!!!     (7) 
 
N is the number of observations in the sample.  
 
The variance of ACAR is calculated using the sample variance measure of σ!! 
from the market model regression in the estimation window: 
 Var ACAR! !!,!! = !!! σ!! τ!, τ!!!!!     (8) 
 
The ACAR is then tested over various sub-periods (short and long-term) for 
statistical significance using a parametric test, as proposed in the literature rely on 
the essential assumption that individual company’s abnormal return is normally 
distributed. If the abnormal returns are indeed normal, independent, and 
identically distributed, the test statistic follows a student t-distribution16, which is 
consistent with the choice of data.    
 
The test statistic is  
 
   𝜃 = !!"#! !  !,!  !!"#(!!"# !  !,!  ! )!/!  ~  N(0,1)          (9) 
 
And the distributional result is asymptotic with respect to the number of securities 
N and the length of the estimation window.  
 
This setup of an event study corresponds to A. Craig MacKinlay (1997), and the 
selection of estimation- and event windows are also motivated by previous 
research. 
                                                
16 Barron, M.J.; Clare, A.D. and Thomas, S.H., 1997 
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6- Results  
In this section we will go through our tests and their results, which are based on 
an event study approach described in the previous section. The hypotheses are 
presented chronologically and the results are discussed respectively17.  
6.1 Announcement effect surrounding credit ratings 
In order to make a conclusion about our first three hypotheses we conduct t-tests 
to examine whether the average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) are 
different from zero surrounding the rating updates. One-tailed tests are performed 
on the credit rating updates that are predictable in which direction it affects stock 
returns, while two-tailed tests are conducted on credit rating updates where the 
outcome is less predictable. One-tailed tests are performed on Upgrades, positive 
Credit Watches and positive Affirmations to test whether ACAR is greater than 
zero, while Downgrades, negative Credit Watches and negative Affirmations are 
tested for ACAR less than zero. The two-tailed tests are conducted on the rating 
types Confirmation and New rating. 
Hypothesis 1: Downgrades, negative Credit Watches and negative Affirmations 
have a negative impact on stock returns.  
Figure 6.1.1  
Figure 6.1.1 presents the development of average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) 
for Downgrades, negative Credit Watches and Affirmations with negative Outlook. ACAR 
is plotted over a 21 days period where t=0 is the announcement day.  
                                                
17 A thorough analysis and conclusion of our hypotheses are presented in the next section.  
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As shown in figure 6.1.1, the ACAR from Downgrades seems to vary randomly 
before and after the rating update while a sharp decline is observed at the date of 
the announcement. The decline is sustained over the 10 following days. 
 
ACAR for Negative Credit Watches is less severe than for Downgrades. It varies 
fairly randomly during the period but shows a clear decline starting at an earlier 
point compared to Downgrades.  
 
The abnormal returns surrounding negative Affirmations do not have a clear 
pattern. There is a slight decrease in CAR preceding the rating update, followed 
by an unstable increase in the following 10 days. 
 
Table 6.1.1 
 
 
The least surprising, but nonetheless relevant results from table 6.1.1 are the 
Downgrades, which have proven to be significantly negative in the majority of 
previous papers. The ACAR for Downgrades is significant at a 99% confidence 
level for the initial (t=0 to t=+1) and short-term (t=0 to t=+5) event window, while 
the pre-event (t=-10 to t=-1) window is significant at a 90 % level. The initial 
event window contains a remarkable negative effect on stock prices of 1.93% 
ACAR over the two days.  
 
Negative Credit Watch updates affect stock returns more than Downgrades in the 
preceding days to an announcement and is significant at a 95 % confidence level. 
The initial event window is significant at a 99 % confidence level with an ACAR 
of –1.26 %.  
 
Negative Affirmations, in contrast, do not have any significant effect on stock 
prices, as implied in table 6.1.1. The signs are as predicted negative in the first 
Average CAR measures 
Downgrades Credit Watches Negative Affirmations Negative 
Window ACAR test-statistic p-value ACAR test-statistic p-value ACAR test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 -0,0154 * -1,3000 0,0984 -0,0208 ** -2,1341 0,0192 -0,0123 -1,0694 0,1454
    0 to +1 -0,0193 *** -3,6431 0,0002 -0,0126 *** -2,8881 0,0030 -0,0043 -0,8390 0,2030
    0 to + 5 -0,0223 *** -2,4232 0,0087 -0,0115 * -1,5168 0,0682 0,0051 0,5764 0,2837
# of observations 92 46 44
Presentation of the tests conducted on downgrades, negative credit wathces and affirmations with negative outlook. We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) 
are significantly less than zero over our three event windows.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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two event windows. However the short-term window show a positive, although 
not significant, effect on stock prices.  
 
These results indicate that Downgrades and negative Credit Watches have 
negative impact on stock prices surrounding the credit rating updates, while 
negative Affirmations demonstrate no significant announcement effect.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Upgrades, positive Credit Watches and positive Affirmations have 
a positive impact on stock returns.  
Figure 6.1.2  
Figure 6.1.2 presents the development of average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) 
for Upgrades, positive Credit Watches and Affirmations with positive Outlook. ACAR is 
plotted over a 21 days period where t=0 is the announcement day. 
The development of ACAR regarding Upgrades is not in favour of our alternative 
hypothesis. The ACAR shows a clear negative drift starting at eight days prior to 
the rating update and continues to fall during the sample period, with a minor 
positive shift the day before announcement.  
 
Positive Credit Watch also has a marginally positive trend surrounding the rating 
update. However, the majority of the effect appears prior to the rating update, thus 
similar to Affirmations with positive Outlook.  
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Affirmations with positive Outlook have a positive development in ACAR 
compared to Upgrades. However, the ACAR seems to take effect four days prior 
to the rating update and stabilize after the announcement.  
 
Table 6.1.2 
 
 
The results from our tests regarding Upgrades, positive Credit Watch and 
Affirmation with positive Outlook are presented in table 6.1.2. According to the 
test we see that Upgrades only have a significant impact on stock prices in our 
pre-announcement window. However, the effect is negative, which was not the 
predicted direction of this rating category.  
 
Positive Credit Watches and positive Affirmations have a negative impact on 
stock prices after the rating update, although not significant. Affirmation with a 
positive Outlook is the only rating update (of these three), which have any 
significant positive impact on stock prices and this effect occurs prior to the 
announcement.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Confirmations (Moody’s only) and New ratings have an impact on 
stock returns. 
Since we do not have any obvious predictions of how the rating updates New 
rating and Confirmation could affect stock prices, we perform a two-tailed t-test. 
We test to see if ACAR is different from zero surrounding the announcement day. 
 
 
 
Average CAR measures 
Upgrades Credit Watches Positive Affirmations Positive 
Window ACAR test-statistic p-value ACAR test-statistic p-value ACAR test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 -0,0095 * -1,3441 0,0925 0,0208 1,2715 0,1121 0,0168 * 1,6063 0,0639
    0 to +1 0,0008 0,2444 0,4039 -0,0048 -0,6496 0,2632 -0,0010 -0,2089 0,4186
    0 to + 5 -0,0068 -1,2415 0,1101 -0,0157 -1,2351 0,1186 -0,0004 -0,0491 0,4807
# of observations 51 15 17
Presentation of the tests conducted on upgrades, positive credit wathces and affirmations with positive outlook. We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) 
are significantly greater than zero over our three event windows.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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Figure 6.1.3  
Figure 6.1.3 presents the development of average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) 
for Confirmations and New ratings. ACAR is plotted over a 21 days period where t=0 is 
the announcement day. 
 
We see that there is no particular announcement effect surrounding New ratings. 
Abnormal returns are keeping a stable level through the whole period. In contrast, 
Confirmations show a negative shift in abnormal returns starting at t=-1. 
 
Table 6.1.3. 
 
 
Table 6.1.3 shows that there is no significant effect surrounding New ratings, as 
expected from the figure. With Confirmations we find a significant negative effect 
at the 95% confidence level following the rating update in both the initial event 
window and the short-term event window.  
6.2 Standard & Poor’s versus Moody’s and Low versus High debt and risk level 
Our second set of hypotheses seeks to find divergence in announcement effect if 
we split rating updates by attributes. We split events into rating updates by 
Moody’s/Standard & Poor’s, on companies with low/high debt-to-equity ratio and 
Average CAR measures 
New Confirmations
Window ACAR test-statistic p-value ACAR test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 -0,0049 -0,4008 0,6917 -0,0016 -0,0986 0,9225
    0 to +1 0,0082 1,5072 0,1434 -0,0193 ** -2,7191 0,0136
    0 to + 5 0,0040 0,4250 0,6742 -0,0326 ** -2,6502 0,0158
# of observations 28 20
Presentation of the tests conducted on new and confirmations rating updates. We test if the average cumulative 
abnormal returns(ACAR) are significantly different from zero over our three event windows.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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by companies with low/high risk level.  
In order to test the hypotheses about different attributes, we divide our sample into 
two sub-groups and test for differences in the means. We apply an independent 
two-sample t-test, which have three slightly different approaches based on sub-
sample size and variance. We take this into account by conducting F-tests of 
equality of variances18 in order to conclude which of the three tests to apply. In 
cases of unequal sample size and variances the test is also known as a Welch’s t-
test. 
Due to shortage of data in some of the rating categories, we have decided to set 
the limit to at least 15 rating updates after dividing the categories into sub-
samples. Hence, only Downgrades, Upgrades and negative Credit Watches are 
included in the forthcoming tests in order to get reliable and powerful results. 
Hypothesis 4: The market’s reaction from a credit rating update differs in 
magnitude dependent on whether the rating update is given by Moody’s or 
Standard & Poor’s. 
The test statistic is ACARM (Moody’s) minus ACARS&P (Standard and Poor’s) 
over the specified event windows. If this test-statistic is significantly different 
from zero in any of the event windows, then we can assume that the market react 
stronger towards one of the CRAs. 
Table 6.2.1. 
 
Table 6.2.1 shows us the test for differences in means between Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s in three rating update categories: Downgrades, Upgrades and 
negative Credit Watches. The difference in means on Downgrades and negative 
Credit Watches are small and insignificant, which indicate that the market does 
                                                
18 See appendix 6.2 for calculation and conclusion regarding the F-test. 
Test for difference in mean
Downgrades Upgrades Credit Watches Negative 
Window ACARM – ACARS&P test-statistic p-value ACARM – ACARS&P test-statistic p-value ACARM – ACARS&P test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 -0,0037 -0,3429 0,3662 -0,0162 -1,1768 0,1225 -0,0045 -0,1660 0,4345
    0 to +1 -0,0063 0,4613 0,3230 -0,0107 * -1,5048 0,0694 -0,0130 -0,6893 0,2471
    0 to + 5 -0,0319 -0,3009 0,3821 -0,0025 -0,2495 0,4020 -0,0039 -0,1865 0,4265
# of observations Moody's:36 S&P:56 Moody's:20 S&P:31 Moody's:23 S&P:23
Presentation of the tests conducted on downgrades, upgrades and negative credit wathces. We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) 
differ significantly between Moody's and S&P.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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not have any preferences between the two CRA regarding negative rating updates. 
On the contrary, we find significant result regarding Upgrades in the initial event 
window. The result implies that the market initially react more positively to 
Upgrades when it is released by Standard & Poor’s instead of Moody’s.  
 
Figure 6.2.1 
Figure 6.2.1 presents the development of average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) 
for Upgrades between Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. ACAR is plotted over a 21 days 
period where t=0 is the announcement day. 
 
Figure 6.2.1 present the ACAR surrounding Upgrades from Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s. We see that stock returns are slightly increasing when 
Standard & Poor’s releases updates, while decreasing when announced by 
Moody’s, explaining the significant initial event window19.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The impact on stock prices from a credit rating update is dependent 
on whether companies’ capital structure consists of high or low debt. 
The test-statistic for this hypothesis is (ACARHigh – ACARLow), which is defined 
based on whether the tested companies have high or low debt-to-equity ratio. As 
mentioned earlier, high debt to equity ratio is associated with companies that have 
a debt-to-equity ratio in excess of 1.  
 
                                                
19 Graphs of ACAR for Downgrades and negative Credit Watches between Moody’s and Standard 
& Poor’s can be found in appendix 6.2.D. 
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Table 6.2.2. 
 
From table 6.2.2 we see that the initial and short-term event windows are 
significant at a 95 % confidence level when measuring the differences in 
announcement effect between companies with high and low debt during a 
Downgrade. Hence, for companies that have a capital structure dominated by 
debt, Downgrades have significantly more impact on stock returns.  
On the contrary, for Upgrades and negative Credit Watches we find no significant 
differences related to debt structure. 20 
Hypothesis 6: The impact on stock prices from a credit rating update is dependent 
on whether the companies have a high or low level of risk (beta). 
The test-statistic is equal to the previous hypothesis: (ACARHigh – ACARLow), 
where ACARHigh contains ratings with the one-third highest beta values and 
ACARLow the one-third lowest beta values, within the different rating categories.  
Table 6.2.3. 
 
Table 6.2.3 present the results after testing for differences between high and low 
beta values in the three different rating categories. As shown, we see that high vs. 
low risk is only significantly different with respect to Downgrades and only in the 
short-term event window.  
                                                
20 Graphs of comparison between companies with high and low debt with respect to developing 
ACAR’s are presented in appendix 6.2.E. 
 
Test for difference in mean
Downgrades Upgrades Credit Watches Negative 
Window ACARHigh – ACARLow test-statistic p-value ACARHigh – ACARLow test-statistic p-value ACARHigh – ACARLow test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 0,0048 0,1123 0,4555 -0,0062 -0,3889 0,3500 -0,0334 -0,8705 0,1957
    0 to +1 -0,0427 -1,0677 0,1468 0,0019 0,2442 0,4043 0,0334 1,2375 0,1131
    0 to + 5 -0,0690 * -0,0690 0,0793 0,0088 0,7980 0,2154 0,0327 1,1226 0,1356
# of observations High Beta:31 Low Beta:31 High Beta:17 Low Beta:17 High Beta:15 Low Beta:15
Presentation of the tests conducted on downgrades, upgrades and negative credit wathces. We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) 
differ significantly between companies with high and low risk. 
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
Test for difference in mean
Downgrades Upgrades Credit Watches Negative 
Window ACARHigh – ACARLow test-statistic p-value ACARHigh – ACARLow test-statistic p-value ACARHigh – ACARLow test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 -0,0294 -0,8709 0,1937 -0,0092 -0,5815 0,2819 -0,0068 -0,2520 0,4011
    0 to +1 -0,0611 ** -1,9682 0,0277 -0,0052 -0,5123 0,3079 0,0042 0,2344 0,4081
    0 to + 5 -0,0806 ** -2,1745 0,0174 0,0058 0,4443 0,3312 -0,0278 -1,3002 0,1002
# of observations D/E>1:42 D/E<:48 D/E>1:13 D/E<:35 D/E>1:20 D/E<:25
Presentation of the tests conducted on downgrades, upgrades and negative credit wathces. We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) 
differ significantly between companies with high and low debt. 
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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6.3 Market anticipation and sustainability of a credit rating update ‘effect’ 
In this section we will present our results regarding the impact of the pre-
announcement tools: Outlook and Credit Watch. Also, we will present our 
findings concerning sustainability of announcement effects using a longer event 
window.  
 
Hypothesis 7: The effect from Upgrades and Downgrades with previous 
corresponding Outlook/Credit Watch is anticipated by the market and will have 
no impact on stock prices.  
First we divide our original sample into two sub-samples21 dependent on whether 
the market has received any information regarding an upcoming Upgrade or 
Downgrade.  The sub-samples are allocated based on two factors: Previous 
Outlook and previous Credit Watch preceding the Downgrade/Upgrade. Further, 
we test if the ACAR is different from zero in the sub-groups using a one-tailed 
test. 
Table 6.3.1 
 
First, we test the effect from Downgrades. As presented in table 6.3.1 we see that 
our results regarding the market’s anticipation is fragmented. Downgrades with 
previous negative Outlook are not significant in any of our event windows. On the 
contrary, Downgrades with previous negative Credit Watch have significant 
effects on stock prices in both our initial and short-term window with a 
confidence level of 99%. This suggests that the market is more surprised by a 
Downgrade when it follows a negative Credit Watch than an Outlook addition.  
 
                                                
21 Appendix 6.3.1 contains figures showing development of average AR and ACAR for the 
different sub-samples.  
 
Average CAR measures 
Downgrades Downgrades
Previous Negative Outlook Previous Negative Credit Watch
Window ACAR test-statistic p-value ACAR test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 -0,0233 -1,0989 0,1394 -0,0024 -0,1651 0,4350
    0 to +1 0,0006 0,0666 0,4736 -0,0311 *** -4,8833 0,0000
    0 to + 5 0,0083 0,5041 0,3085 -0,0484 *** -4,3811 0,0001
# of observations 39 30
Presentation of the tests conducted on negative outlook and negative credit watch. We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) 
are significantly less than zero over our three event windows.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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Table 6.3.2. 
 
 
 
Regarding Upgrades, ratings with previous positive Outlook are the only initial 
event window that is significant. However this rating have a negative impact on 
stock prices and consequently do not support our alternative hypothesis. The same 
applies for the two pre-announcement windows that are significant.  
Hypothesis 8: The announcement effects from credit rating updates are not 
temporary and will be sustained over time.  
To test whether the effect is sustainable over time we include a new event 
window, which is defined from t=0 to t=4522.  The idea behind this long-term 
event window is to test whether ACAR is significantly larger than zero for 
positive rating updates and less than zero for negative rating updates over the 
entire event window. Hence, the effect does not fade out during the long-term 
window. If the test of ACAR in the long-term event window is insignificant, we 
can assume that the effect has withdrawn back to its origin, thus not sustainable.  
In this test we have only included rating update categories where we have found 
significant effects in the predicted direction during the initial event window. This 
is obvious because it is necessary to have an initial effect to test whether the effect 
is sustainable or not.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 Presented in section 5.4 – Methodology. 
Average CAR measures 
Upgrades Upgrades
Previous Positive Outlook Previous Positive Credit Watch
Window ACAR test-statistic p-value ACAR test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 -0,0261 ** -2,0196 0,0355 -0,0279 ** -2,2233 0,0240
    0 to +1 -0,0101 * -1,7560 0,0548 0,0038 0,6825 0,2545
    0 to + 5 -0,0117 -1,1654 0,1355 -0,0118 -1,2106 0,1257
# of observations 11 12
Presentation of the tests conducted on negative outlook and negative credit watch. We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) 
are significantly less than zero over our three event windows.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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Figure 6.3.2 
Figure 6.3.2 presents the development of average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) 
for Downgrades, negative Credit Watches and Confirmations. ACAR is plotted over a 46 
days period where t=0 is the announcement day. 
 
In the long-term event window for Downgrades we see that the ACAR does not 
change much after the rating update until t=13, but then have a positive drift 
ending up correcting the effect and more so. Hence, the effect on Downgrades 
does not appear to be sustainable.   
 
The effect from negative Credit Watches is sustained after the rating update and 
appears to be relatively stable through the whole event window.  
 
ACAR for Confirmations in the long-term event window seems to have a slightly 
negative drift, with little volatility. This implies that the negative effect following 
Confirmations is sustainable.  
 
Table 6.3.3. 
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Average CAR measures 
Downgrades Negative Credit Watches Confirmations (Moody's)
Window ACAR test-statistic p-value ACAR test-statistic p-value ACAR test-statistic p-value
    0 to + 45 0,0414 * 1,6250 0,0538 -0,0251 -1,1996 0,1183 -0,0571 * -1,6780 0,0549
# of observations 92 46 20
Presentation of the tests conducted on downgrades, negative credit wathces and confirmations. We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) 
are significantly less than zero in our long-term event window.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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Table 6.3.3 present the test whether ACAR is less than zero for Downgrades, 
negative Credit Watches and Confirmations in the long-term event window. The 
results from the tests are that only Confirmation has a sustainable negative effect 
on stock returns over the event window. Downgrades are also significant, but in 
the opposite direction, hence has a positive significant drift over the 45 days after 
a rating update. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GRA19003 Master thesis                     03.09.2012 
Page 37 
 
7- Robustness analysis 
7.1 Robustness 
In this section we will study the robustness of our data. The tests conducted are 
based on the assumptions that returns are independently and normally distributed. 
A robustness analysis will reveal both strengths and weaknesses of our data and 
tests.  After searching for outliers we eliminated four observations, all being 
downgrades, due to contaminating events23. Further, tests including downgrades 
were conducted excluding these observations.  
 
In the case of low number of observations, daily stock returns usually deviate 
considerably from normality. However, according to The Central Limit Theorem, 
the sample mean asymptotically converge to a normal distribution. In addition, 
Brown & Warner (1985) concludes that non-normality of daily returns does not 
have any obvious impact on event study methodologies.  
 
Another concern related to our methodology and data is that event studies in 
general suffers from a problem of distinguishing the effect from the tested events 
when using share price data.  However, we have no reason to believe that our data 
suffer from these problems more than papers relating to our topic. Appendix 7.1 
presents plots of the distribution of our CAR for different rating updates during a 
21 day window starting from t=-10 to t=10. 
7.2 Outliers  
Based on the plots presented in figure 7.2.1 we have reason to believe that there 
are notable outliers in our Downgrades sample.  Hence, to make our result more 
robust we want to test for extreme values in our data.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 See section 7.2. Outliers 
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Figure 7.2.1: distribution of CAR plots.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to identify outliers we organise ACAR by size including the ten days 
before a rating update and ten days after. Further, we calculate critical values for 
eliminating extreme values by taking the 10th and 90th percentile and multiplying 
them with five24. If any of the original values exceeds the critical values, we 
search the Factiva database in order to detect if there are any contaminating news 
on the given dates. The test resulted in identifying 4 contaminating news for 
Downgrades25. The extreme values in the data are then set to zero, hence do not 
affect our new results in the forthcoming tests.  
7.3 Re-testing Downgrades after elimination of contaminating news. 
Hypothesis 1: Downgrades have a negative impact on stock returns.26  
 
Table 7.3.1. 
 
 
Table 7.3.1 present the one-tailed test on Downgrades after taken into account 
outliers (contaminating news). As expected, the result is less significant than the 
original sample including the extreme values.  However, the initial event window 
is still significant at a 90 % confidence level. 
                                                
24 Table of the critical values is presented in appendix 7.2 
25 See appendix 7.3 
26 Hypothesis 1, only including downgrades 
Average CAR measures 
Downgrades
Window ACAR test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 0,0010 0,0863 0,4657
    0 to +1 -0,0085 * -1,5942 0,0572
    0 to + 5 -0,0088 -0,9575 0,1704
# of observations 92
Presentation of the tests conducted on downgrades after elimination
 of contaminating news. We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns
 (ACAR) are significantly less than zero over our three event windows.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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Hypothesis 4: The market’s reaction from Downgrades is dependent on whether 
the rating update comes from Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s.27 
 
Table 7.3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differences between Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s after correcting for 
contaminating news are changed considering Downgrades. The original result did 
not conclude with any significant differences, however, after the correction we see 
from table 7.3.2 that our short-term event window is significant at a 90 % 
confidence level.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The impact on stock prices from a Downgrade is dependent on 
whether the companies’ capital structure consists of high or low debt.28 
Table 7.3.3. 
 
The result after correcting for contaminating news considering differences 
between companies with high and low debt level is even more significant in the 
two latter event windows. The p-values are decreasing from 0,027 and 0,0174 in 
the initial and short-term event windows to 0,004 and 0,0067, as shown in table 
7.3.3.  
 
                                                
27 Hypothesis 4, only including downgrades 
28 Hypothesis 5, only including downgrades 
Test for difference in mean
Downgrades
Window ACARHigh – ACARLow test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 0,0067 0,2918 0,3856
    0 to +1 -0,0373 *** -2,7487 0,0040
    0 to + 5 -0,0511 *** -2,5464 0,0067
# of observations D/E>1:42 D/E<:48
Presentation of the test conducted on downgrades after elimination of contaminating news.  
We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) differ significantly between companies
 with high and low debt. 
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
Test for difference in mean
Downgrades
Window ACARM – ACARS&P test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 -0,0037 -0,1595 0,4368
    0 to +1 -0,0063 -0,4601 0,3233
    0 to + 5 -0,0319 * -1,4651 0,0742
# of observations Moody's:36 S&P:56
Presentation of the test conducted on downgrades after elimination of contaminating news.  
We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) differ significantly between Moody's and S&P.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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Hypothesis 6: The impact on stock prices from a Downgrade is dependent on 
whether the companies have a high or low level of risk (beta).29 
 
Table 7.3.4. 
 
Table 7.3.4 present differences in ACAR, regarding Downgrades, between 
companies with high and low risk after taking into account contaminating news. 
Our new result shows significantly differences between the two categories in the 
pre-announcement window, but not the short-term window that we found 
significant before the correction of contaminating news.  
 
Hypothesis 7: The effect from Downgrades with previous corresponding 
Outlook/Credit Watch is anticipated by the market and will have no impact on 
stock prices.30 
 
Table 7.3.5. 
 
 
Table 7.3.5 present Downgrades followed by a negative Outlook or Credit Watch 
after correction of contaminating news. The new result shows that none of the 
event windows are significant, in contrast to the result including the 
contaminating news where both the initial and short-term event windows in 
Downgrades preceded by a negative Credit Watch were significant.  
                                                
29 Hypothesis 6, only including downgrades 
30 Hypothesis 7, only including downgrades 
Test for difference in mean
Downgrades
Window ACARHigh – ACARLow test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 -0,0441 * -1,6514 0,0519
    0 to +1 -0,0057 -0,4171 0,3391
    0 to + 5 -0,0242 -1,0276 0,1541
# of observations High Beta:31 Low Beta:31
Presentation of the test conducted on downgrades after elimination of contaminating news. We test if the average 
 cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) differ significantly between companies with high and low beta values. 
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
Average CAR measures 
Downgrades Downgrades
Previous Negative Outlook Previous Negative Credit Watch
Window ACAR test-statistic p-value ACAR test-statistic p-value
 -10 to -1 0,0155 0,7346 0,2335 -0,0024 -0,1651 0,4350
    0 to +1 0,0006 0,0666 0,4736 0,0022 0,3443 0,3666
    0 to + 5 0,0083 0,5041 0,3085 -0,0071 -0,6415 0,2631
# of observations 39 30
Presentation of the tests conducted on downgrades with no outlook, negative outlook and negative credit watch after elimination of contaminating news. 
We test if the average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR)  are significantly less than zero over our three event windows.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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Hypothesis 8: The announcement effect surrounding Downgrades are not 
temporary and will be sustained over time.31 
 
Table 7.3.6. 
 
Table 7.3.6 shows that the elimination of contaminating news has made the long-
term event window more significant, although still in the opposite direction of 
what we tested for. The positive drift over the 45 days has changed from having a 
p-value of 0,0538 to 0,0169.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
31 Hypothesis 8, only including downgrades 
Average CAR measures 
Downgrades
Window ACAR test-statistic p-value
    0 to + 45 0,0548 ** 2,1544 0,0169
# of observations 92
Presentation of the test conducted on downgrades after elimination of contaminating news.  We test if the
 average cumulative abnormal returns(ACAR) are significantly less than zero in our long-term event window.
*** Significant at a 99% confidence level
** Significant at a 95% confidence level
* Significant at a 90% confidence level
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8- Analysis of results and Conclusion 
This section will be used to interpret and analyse our results. We will state 
whether our hypotheses are rejected or not, as well as explaining possible reasons 
for our results. At last we will make a conclusion on to what degree credit ratings 
influence and provide new information to the Scandinavian stock market. 
8.1 Announcement effect surrounding rating updates 
In this part we have investigated if there is a relationship between credit rating 
updates and stock prices. All types of credit rating updates are tested, and the 
results vary.  
Hypothesis 1: Downgrades, negative Credit Watches and negative Affirmations 
have a negative impact on stock returns.    
We can partly reject the null hypothesis. Before correcting for contaminating 
news we found strong negative effects significant at the 99% confidence level 
surrounding both Downgrades and negative Credit Watch updates. There were no 
significant abnormal returns surrounding Affirmations with negative Outlook. 
After correcting for contaminating news, Downgrades are still significant, 
however, only in the initial window at the 90% confidence level.  
Hypothesis 2: Upgrades, positive Credit Watches and positive Affirmations have 
a positive impact on stock returns.  
We cannot reject the null hypothesis. There are some effects found surrounding 
Upgrades and Affirmations with positive Outlook, although only in our pre-
announcement window. The effect found preceding Upgrades is not in the 
predicted direction, making the significance unsupportive of our alternative 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Confirmations (Moody’s only) and New ratings have an impact on 
stock returns. 
We can partly reject the null hypothesis. We found significant negative effect with 
Confirmations starting on rating day; this effect is significant at the 95% 
confidence level. There was no effect surrounding New ratings.  
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In these fundamental tests we found results similar to earlier research from other 
regions. There are significant negative effects surrounding negative news, while 
there are no significant positive effects surrounding positive news. Based on our 
literature review and theoretical background, we will explain why this is the 
typical results, and also our results. A combination of the information content 
hypothesis and timing theory is what our explanation is based on. As stated in 
theoretical background, assuming that the market efficiency is not stronger than 
semi-strong efficient, information content hypothesis32 could explain 
announcement effects. This hypothesis states that it is appropriate to assume 
information asymmetry between the market and the CRAs. The CRAs benefit 
from an economy of scale and additionally have access to non-public information. 
Announcement effects surrounding rating updates could therefore be explained by 
private information being unveiled. An important issue to address after claiming 
this explanation is the differences particularly between positive and negative 
news. More specifically, why are there only significant effects surrounding 
negative news? As described in our literature review, timing33 could explain just 
this. CRAs seem to show a higher responsiveness to negative news, due to the 
consequences of a too high rating being more severe than a too low rating. 
Another explanation is that the rated companies have higher incentives to 
communicate positive news to the market, hence the asymmetry between the 
market and companies concerning positive news are small. On the contrary, the 
negative news is held back by the companies and revealed by the rating agencies, 
making the announcement effect from negative news more severe.  
 
Regarding the significant negative returns following Confirmations, it is not easy 
to draw any immediate explanations on why this effect is present. Information 
content hypothesis and timing theory is not applicable as it was with negative 
news, as we do not have a predicted direction with Confirmations. One potential 
explanation could be that the market expects an Upgrade preceding the majority 
of the Confirmations included in this data set, leading to disappointment in the 
market when the Upgrade does not come.  
 
                                                
32 Zaima, J.K. and McCarthy, J., 1988 
33 Altman and Rijken, 2005 
GRA19003 Master thesis                     03.09.2012 
Page 44 
As we did not find any significant effects surrounding New ratings (companies 
not rated earlier), our tests are not able to confirm the claimed “certification 
effect”34. However, it is reason to believe that this effect would have surfaced 
earlier, more specifically when the news about attaining a rating was made public. 
We have not tested for abnormal stock price effects surrounding these events, and 
can therefore not draw any conclusions regarding “certification effects” in the 
Scandinavian market. Still, it is sensible to believe that it exists based on earlier 
research. 
8.2 Standard & Poor’s versus Moody’s and Low versus High debt level 
Hypothesis 4: The market’s reaction from a credit rating update differs in 
magnitude dependent on whether the rating update is given by Moody’s or 
Standard & Poor’s. 
As presented in table 6.2.135, only Upgrades are significantly different comparing 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s before eliminating contaminating news. We 
found a slightly positive initial reaction surrounding Upgrades from Standard & 
Poor’s, while the initial effect from Moody’s is negative.  
  
After elimination of contaminating news, Downgrades appear to be significant in 
the short-term event window. The difference in ACAR over the 6 days window is 
-3,19%. The test-statistic is ACARMoody’s - ACARS&P, hence it seems that the 
market react more to Downgrades from Moody’s during the short-term event 
window. As a result we can partly reject our null hypothesis and claim that there 
is a difference in how the market reacts, given the credit rating agency.  
 
Based on the differences between Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, explained in 
section 3: The rating process, we had reason to believe that the outcome of the 
test would be significant. Standard & Poor’s has a well-defined and descriptive 
process of how they rate a company, while Moody’s approach is concealed and 
commonly thought of as a “black box”. Our tests conclude that the market react 
stronger to Downgrades given by Moody’s, and additionally react negatively to 
Upgrades. This confirms our hypothesis and supports the assumption that higher 
secrecy in methodology by Moody’s increases the information asymmetry with 
                                                
34 Hsueh and Kidwell, 1988 and Elayan, Hus and Meyer (2003) 
35 Test of hypothesis 4  
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the market. This makes the announcement effect surrounding ratings from 
Moody’s greater and also less predictable.  
Hypothesis 5: The impact on stock prices from a credit rating update is dependent 
on whether companies’ capital structure consists of high or low debt. 
From the different ratings that are tested, after divided into sub-groups based on 
level of debt, only Downgrades appears to be affected by high debt-to-equity 
ratio. With p-values in the initial and short-term event windows of 0,027 and 
0,017 before eliminating contaminating news and 0,004 and 0,0067 after, we can 
conclude that companies with capital structure dominated by debt are more 
sensitive to Downgrades compared to companies with less debt. Even though the 
rating agencies take into account the level of debt when conducting their ratings, 
the market seems to emphasize this in a higher degree when it comes to 
Downgrades.  
Based on the significant results regarding Downgrades, our conclusion is that we 
partly reject the null hypothesis stating that the impact from credit ratings is 
independent of the companies’ capital structure. This is interesting as the level of 
debt is highly observable i.e. for an investor, and thus, this finding could be used 
as a tool to take precautions when trying to predict a stock price reaction from a 
rating update. 
Hypothesis 6: The impact on stock prices from a credit rating update is dependent 
on whether the companies have a high or low level of risk (beta). 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis, however there are some results worth 
mentioning. Before correcting for contaminating news the short-term event 
window showed significant effect with a p-value of 0,079, while after correcting 
for contaminating news the only significance was found in the pre-announcement 
window with a p-value of 0,052.  We conclude that the level of risk, beta, only 
affects the impact on stock prices from Downgrades prior to a rating update, 
hence, do not have any impact on the announcement effect on stock prices 
following a rating update. Beta is therefore not to be regarded as an amplifying 
factor when predicting the announcement effect following a credit update. 
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8.3 Market anticipation and sustainability of a credit rating update ‘effect’ 
Findings regarding impact on announcement effect given use of pre-
announcement tools are presented in this part. Also, we will present findings on 
the sustainability of credit ratings, studied using a longer event window. 
Hypothesis 7: The effect from Upgrades and Downgrades with previous 
corresponding Outlook/Credit Watch is anticipated by the market and will have 
no impact on stock prices.  
The pre-announcement tools Outlook and Credit Watch are used to narrow the 
information asymmetry between the CRAs and the market. We tested both 
Downgrades and Upgrades divided with respect to the use of pre-announcement 
tools. Before elimination of contaminating news we found highly significant 
effects surrounding Downgrades following a negative Credit Watch, contradicting 
with our hypothesis. After the robustness analysis where we eliminate ratings with 
contaminating news, this significance withdraws. Also, with Upgrades, there are 
no significant positive effects surrounding the credit ratings when pre-
announcement tools are used to warn the market. Our results support our 
hypothesis making us able to reject the null hypothesis.  
This result shows that the implementation of pre-announcement tools have been 
successful for the CRAs, narrowing the asymmetry gap between them and the 
market participants. In contrast, as earlier stated36, when not dividing with respect 
to pre-announcement tools, significant announcement effects surround 
Downgrades.   
Hypothesis 8: The announcement effects from credit rating updates are not 
temporary and will be sustained over time.  
We can partly reject the null hypothesis. Amongst the three rating categories we 
investigated in this test, Confirmations are the single category where we found a 
significant (negative) effect throughout our long-term event window. It is not easy 
to retrieve any particular insights regarding the sustainability of Confirmations’s 
announcement effect. This effect did not have an initial predicted direction due to 
the nature of the update; thus, the only reasonable explanation for this effect is 
                                                
36 See Hypothesis 1 
GRA19003 Master thesis                     03.09.2012 
Page 47 
that in most cases where a Confirmation is issued, the market was expecting an 
Upgrade.  
Negative Credit Watches is arguably sustainable even though it has no significant 
effect in the long-term event window; this is due to the fact that a substantial part 
of the stock price effect appears before the announcement day, not impacting the 
test (t=0 - t=45). Hence, when it shows no significance in the long-term window 
this means that the stock price remains at the level it was lowered to pre 
announcement. On the other hand, Downgrades showed no sustainable effect after 
the announcement, rather the opposite, as the long-term effect following 
Downgrades are positive (correcting the short-term negative effect). The short 
non-sustainable effect following Downgrades could be considered an overreaction 
from the market. 
Negative Credit Watches being sustainable in the long term while Downgrades are 
not is supporting our earlier finding37 that the pre-announcement tools work. It 
would seem that the market incorporates new sustainable information in the stock 
price after a negative Credit Watch, while not after a Downgrade. This implies 
that the negative Credit Watch in many cases prepares the market for a potential 
Downgrade, which in turn is its purpose.  
8.4 Concluding remarks 
In terms of results, our thesis replicate earlier research papers to a certain extent. 
We mainly found abnormal returns in stock prices surrounding negative updates 
from CRAs, specifically Downgrades and negative Credit Watch updates. With 
regards to positive rating updates, we found no positive abnormal returns. We 
have presented two theories to explain these results, a combination of higher 
information asymmetry between the issuer and market concerning negative news, 
and the timing theory.  
We also defined some specialised hypotheses with the purpose of finding 
interesting results showing differences in announcement effects based on 
observable contrasting attributes. By doing this we were able to find and present 
results adding something new to the literature, particularly for our choice of 
region. Firstly, we found that the market responds differently to rating updates 
                                                
37 See Hypothesis 7 
GRA19003 Master thesis                     03.09.2012 
Page 48 
depending on whether Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s publishes it. We wanted to 
test this based on the known differences in the CRAs transparency of 
methodology and the methodology itself. Further, companies dominated by debt 
were found to be more sensitive to Downgrades after comparing companies with 
high and low level of debt. Finally, we found that use of the pre-announcement 
tools Credit Watch and Outlook narrows the information asymmetry between the 
issuers and the market, and as such, the implementation of these tools can be seen 
as successful.  
After conducting our tests and analyses we can confirm that CRAs provide new 
information to the market, as there is existence of announcement effects 
surrounding particular credit rating updates. At last, by using observable attributes 
of the companies rated we argue that it is possible to predict to some extent the 
market’s reaction of certain rating updates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GRA19003 Master thesis                     03.09.2012 
Page 49 
 
9- Limitations and suggestions for further research 
In our research we have sought to supply a broad understanding of how the 
different types of credit rating updates affect the Scandinavian stock market. A 
great deal of research has been conducted on the topic of credit ratings. However 
we still believe that there are interesting questions to be answered.  
 
Even though we have included all rating updates that have been made public 
during our sample period, we still lack data in order to get more powerful results 
in some of our sub-samples. Hence, it would be interesting to look at a larger 
market than the Scandinavian and/or to extend the sample period. Additionally, to 
attain more robust results one could specify the data at a lower level. In example, 
a rating change from “AAA” to “A” will perhaps affect stock prices more than a 
change from “AAA” to “AA”. This is a limitation in our study as we have treated 
all rating changes equally.  
 
Another interesting approach would be to look at the conflict of interest 
concerning credit ratings, especially the companies’ option to disclose a particular 
rating. The norm regarding payment of a credit rating is that the companies only 
pay for the rating if it is made public. In order to investigate this, it requires 
extensive inside information from the CRAs or the issuing companies. 
 
A third interesting topic would be to investigate if the announcement effect from 
credit rating updates differ in magnitude dependent on market cycles and state of 
the economy. More specific, examine if the CRAs achieve more or less credibility 
after or during financial crises and/or big related events such as the Enron scandal.  
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10- Appendices 
Appendix 5.3. Complete list of all rating updates. 
Rating # Rating firm Country Name Date Type Outlook New rating
1 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 01.02.2000 Upgrade Stable outlook Baa2
2 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 23.01.2001 Downgrade Stable outlook Baa3
3 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 20.07.2001 Watch update Negative outlook Baa3
4 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 01.10.2001 Downgrade Stable outlook Ba2
5 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 20.11.2001 Watch update Uncertain outlook Ba2
6 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 06.05.2003 Confirmation Stable outlook Ba2
7 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 18.11.2003 Confirmation Stable outlook Ba2
8 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 10.05.2004 Affirmation Positive outlook Ba2
9 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 22.02.2005 Upgrade Stable outlook Ba1
10 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 25.10.2005 Affirmation Positive outlook Ba1
11 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 07.06.2006 Affirmation Positive outlook Ba1
12 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 31.08.2006 Affirmation Stable outlook Ba1
13 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 11.01.2007 Affirmation Stable outlook Ba1
14 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 30.01.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook Ba2
15 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 29.06.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook Ba3
16 Moody's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 30.04.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook Ba3
18 Moody's Norway DNB 24.02.2007 Upgrade No outlook Aaa
19 Moody's Norway DNB 03.04.2007 Watch update Negative outlook Aaa
20 Moody's Norway DNB 10.04.2007 Downgrade Stable outlook Aa1
21 Moody's Norway DNB 12.11.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook Aa1
22 Moody's Norway DNB 22.07.2009 Watch update Negative outlook Aa1
23 Moody's Norway DNB 08.09.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook Aa3
24 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 22.03.2001 Affirmation Stable outlook A2
25 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 07.02.2002 Affirmation Negative outlook A2
26 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 20.06.2003 Affirmation Stable outlook A2
27 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 28.11.2003 Affirmation Stable outlook A2
28 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 23.06.2005 Upgrade Stable outlook A1
29 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 16.02.2006 Watch update Negative outlook A1
30 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 24.04.2006 Downgrade Stable outlook A2
31 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 18.12.2006 Affirmation Developing A2
32 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 03.05.2007 New Stable outlook Baa1
33 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 30.01.2009 Watch update Negative outlook Baa1
34 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 18.03.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook Baa2
35 Moody's Norway NORSK HYDRO 04.05.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook Baa2
36 Moody's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 31.03.2005 New Stable outlook Ba3
37 Moody's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 14.06.2007 Upgrade Stable outlook Ba2
39 Moody's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 30.11.2004 New Stable outlook Baa2
40 Moody's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 06.12.2004 Confirmation No outlook Baa2
41 Moody's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 04.06.2009 New No outlook Baa2
42 Moody's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 04.06.2009 Confirmation No outlook Baa2
43 Moody's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 15.02.2010 Watch update Negative outlook Baa2
44 Moody's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 17.02.2010 Confirmation Stable outlook Baa2
45 Moody's Norway TELENOR 16.05.2000 Watch update Negative outlook
46 Moody's Norway TELENOR 12.01.2001 Downgrade Stable outlook A2
47 Moody's Norway TELENOR 26.07.2001 Affirmation Stable outlook A2
48 Moody's Norway TELENOR 31.10.2005 Watch update Negative outlook A2
49 Moody's Norway TELENOR 16.03.2006 Confirmation Stable outlook A2
50 Moody's Norway TELENOR 29.10.2008 Watch update Negative outlook A2
51 Moody's Norway TELENOR 27.01.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook A3
52 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 26.11.2001 New Negative outlook Baa1
53 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 29.05.2002 Watch update Positive outlook Baa1
54 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 01.07.2002 Confirmation Negative outlook Baa1
55 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 21.08.2002 Watch update Negative outlook Baa1
56 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 02.05.2003 Downgrade Negative outlook Baa3
57 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 05.08.2003 Affirmation Stable outlook Baa3
58 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 17.09.2003 Confirmation Stable outlook Baa3
59 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 18.05.2004 Affirmation Positive outlook Baa3
60 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 08.08.2005 Upgrade Stable outlook Baa2
61 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 29.10.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook Baa2
62 Moody's Norway STOREBRAND 07.05.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook Baa3
63 Moody's Norway STATOIL 23.11.2000 Watch update Negative outlook
64 Moody's Norway STATOIL 14.05.2001 Downgrade Stable outlook A1
65 Moody's Norway STATOIL 23.06.2005 Downgrade No outlook Aa2
66 Moody's Norway STATOIL 31.10.2007 Upgrade No outlook Aa2
67 Moody's Norway AKER SOLUTIONS 18.03.2004 New Stable outlook B2
68 Moody's Norway AKER SOLUTIONS 13.05.2005 Upgrade Positive outlook Ba3
69 Moody's Norway AKER SOLUTIONS 24.04.2006 Upgrade Stable outlook Ba1
70 Moody's Norway DNO INTERNATIONAL 05.11.2003 New Stable outlook Caa2
71 Moody's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 12.10.2001 New Stable outlook Baa3
72 Moody's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 18.10.2005 Affirmation Negative outlook Baa3
73 Moody's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 28.02.2006 Watch update Negative outlook Baa3
74 Moody's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 20.04.2006 Downgrade Stable outlook Ba1
75 Moody's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 17.04.2007 Affirmation Negative outlook Ba1
76 Moody's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 02.11.2007 Downgrade Negative outlook Ba2
77 Moody's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 01.04.2008 Downgrade Negative outlook B1
78 Moody's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 13.02.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook B2
79 Moody's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 03.09.2009 Affirmation Negative outlook B2
83 Moody's Norway NORTHERN OFFSHORE (OSL) 15.05.2002 Downgrade No outlook Caa2
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84 Moody's Norway SONGA OFFSHORE 27.01.2010 New Stable outlook Caa1
85 Moody's Denmark CARLSBERG 'B' 26.01.2006 New Stable outlook Baa3
86 Moody's Denmark CARLSBERG 'B' 25.01.2008 Watch update Negative outlook Baa3
87 Moody's Denmark CARLSBERG 'B' 16.05.2008 Confirmation Stable outlook Baa3
89 Moody's Denmark DANSKE BANK 02.10.2000 Confirmation Positive outlook Aa3
90 Moody's Denmark DANSKE BANK 29.01.2001 Upgrade No outlook Aa2
91 Moody's Denmark DANSKE BANK 16.03.2004 Watch update Positive outlook Aa2
92 Moody's Denmark DANSKE BANK 06.04.2004 Upgrade No outlook Aa1
93 Moody's Denmark DANSKE BANK 14.12.2004 Affirmation Stable outlook Aa1
94 Moody's Denmark DANSKE BANK 24.02.2007 Upgrade No outlook Aaa
95 Moody's Denmark DANSKE BANK 03.04.2007 Watch update Negative outlook Aaa
96 Moody's Denmark DANSKE BANK 10.04.2007 Downgrade No outlook Aa1
97 Moody's Denmark DANSKE BANK 12.11.2008 Watch update Negative outlook Aa1
98 Moody's Denmark DANSKE BANK 13.02.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook Aa3
99 Moody's Denmark JYSKE BANK 24.02.2007 Upgrade No outlook Aa1
100 Moody's Denmark JYSKE BANK 03.04.2007 Watch update Negative outlook Aa1
101 Moody's Denmark JYSKE BANK 10.04.2007 Downgrade No outlook Aa2
102 Moody's Denmark JYSKE BANK 22.07.2009 Watch update Negative outlook Aa2
103 Moody's Denmark JYSKE BANK 08.09.2009 Downgrade No outlook A1
104 Moody's Denmark SYDBANK 24.02.2007 Upgrade No outlook Aa2
105 Moody's Denmark SYDBANK 03.04.2007 Watch update Negative outlook Aa2
106 Moody's Denmark SYDBANK 10.04.2007 Downgrade No outlook Aa3
107 Moody's Denmark SYDBANK 22.07.2009 Watch update Negative outlook Aa3
108 Moody's Denmark SYDBANK 08.09.2009 Downgrade No outlook A1
109 Moody's Denmark NOVO NORDISK 'B' 30.04.2004 New No outlook A2
110 Moody's Denmark TDC 14.11.2000 Watch update Negative outlook Aa3
111 Moody's Denmark TDC 19.02.2001 Downgrade Stable outlook A2
112 Moody's Denmark TDC 19.03.2002 Watch update Negative outlook A2
113 Moody's Denmark TDC 03.05.2002 Downgrade Stable outlook A3
114 Moody's Denmark TDC 28.02.2003 Watch update Negative outlook A3
115 Moody's Denmark TDC 06.08.2003 Downgrade Negative outlook Baa1
116 Moody's Denmark TDC 14.09.2004 Affirmation Negative outlook Baa1
117 Moody's Denmark TDC 06.10.2005 Watch update Negative outlook Baa1
118 Moody's Denmark TDC 30.11.2005 Downgrade Negative outlook Ba1
119 Moody's Denmark TDC 13.04.2006 Downgrade Stable outlook Ba3
120 Moody's Denmark TDC 29.03.2007 Downgrade Stable outlook B1
121 Moody's Denmark TDC 30.01.2009 Upgrade Positive outlook Ba3
122 Moody's Denmark TDC 20.09.2010 Watch update Positive outlook Ba3
123 Moody's Denmark BANKNORDIK 16.05.2008 New No outlook A3
124 Moody's Denmark BANKNORDIK 15.02.2010 Watch update Negative outlook A3
125 Moody's Denmark BANKNORDIK 06.09.2010 Confirmation Stable outlook A3
126 Moody's Denmark RINGKJOBING LANDBOBANK 22.05.2007 New Stable outlook A1
127 Moody's Denmark RINGKJOBING LANDBOBANK 22.07.2009 Watch update Negative outlook A1
128 Moody's Denmark RINGKJOBING LANDBOBANK 08.09.2009 Confirmation Negative outlook A1
129 Moody's Denmark SPAR NORD BANK 06.08.2007 New Stable outlook A1
130 Moody's Denmark SPAR NORD BANK 22.07.2009 Watch update Negative outlook A1
131 Moody's Denmark SPAR NORD BANK 08.09.2009 Downgrade No outlook A2
132 Moody's Denmark SPARBANK 03.06.2010 New Stable outlook Aaa
133 Moody's Denmark SPAREKASSEN LOLLAND 17.06.2010 New Stable outlook Aaa
134 Moody's Denmark VESTJYSK BANK 16.06.2010 New Stable outlook Aaa
135 Moody's Denmark TRYG 07.03.2000 Confirmation Stable outlook A2
136 Moody's Denmark TRYG 30.03.2001 Upgrade Stable outlook A1
137 Moody's Denmark TRYG 31.10.2001 Watch update Negative outlook
138 Moody's Denmark TRYG 19.06.2002 Downgrade Stable outlook A3
139 Moody's Denmark TRYG 01.05.2003 Watch update Negative outlook
140 Moody's Denmark TRYG 24.06.2003 Confirmation Stable outlook A3
141 Moody's Denmark TRYG 14.03.2007 Watch update Positive outlook A3
142 Moody's Denmark TRYG 23.05.2007 Upgrade Stable outlook A2
143 Moody's Denmark NORDEA BANK (CSE) 19.06.2003 Confirmation Stable outlook Aa3
144 Moody's Denmark NORDEA BANK (CSE) 01.03.2004 Confirmation Stable outlook Aa3
145 Moody's Denmark NORDEA BANK (CSE) 24.02.2007 Upgrade No outlook Aaa
146 Moody's Denmark NORDEA BANK (CSE) 03.04.2007 Watch update Negative outlook Aaa
147 Moody's Denmark NORDEA BANK (CSE) 10.04.2007 Downgrade No outlook Aa1
148 Moody's Denmark NORDEA BANK (CSE) 22.07.2009 Watch update Negative outlook Aa1
149 Moody's Denmark NORDEA BANK (CSE) 08.09.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook Aa2
150 Moody's Sweden INVESTOR 'B' 04.09.2002 Watch update Negative outlook A2
151 Moody's Sweden INVESTOR 'B' 14.11.2002 Downgrade Stable outlook Baa1
152 Moody's Sweden INVESTOR 'B' 11.10.2004 Upgrade Stable outlook A3
153 Moody's Sweden INVESTOR 'B' 10.01.2005 Watch update Positive outlook A3
154 Moody's Sweden INVESTOR 'B' 17.02.2005 Upgrade Stable outlook A2
155 Moody's Sweden INVESTOR 'B' 12.12.2005 Affirmation Positive outlook A2
156 Moody's Sweden INVESTOR 'B' 12.11.2007 Upgrade Stable outlook A1
157 Moody's Sweden NORDEA BANK 01.03.2004 New Stable outlook Aa3
158 Moody's Sweden NORDEA BANK 24.02.2007 Upgrade No outlook Aaa
159 Moody's Sweden NORDEA BANK 03.04.2007 Watch update Negative outlook Aaa
160 Moody's Sweden NORDEA BANK 10.04.2007 Downgrade No outlook Aa1
161 Moody's Sweden NORDEA BANK 22.07.2009 Watch update Negative outlook Aa1
162 Moody's Sweden NORDEA BANK 08.09.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook Aa2
163 Moody's Sweden SEB 'A' 22.02.2001 Watch update Positive outlook A2
164 Moody's Sweden SEB 'A' 19.09.2001 Confirmation Stable outlook A2
165 Moody's Sweden SEB 'A' 09.01.2003 Upgrade Stable outlook A1
166 Moody's Sweden SEB 'A' 03.11.2003 Watch update Positive outlook A1
167 Moody's Sweden SEB 'A' 17.02.2004 Upgrade No outlook Aa3
168 Moody's Sweden SEB 'A' 24.02.2007 Upgrade No outlook Aa1
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169 Moody's Sweden SEB 'A' 03.04.2007 Watch update Negative outlook Aa1
170 Moody's Sweden SEB 'A' 10.04.2007 Downgrade No outlook Aa2
171 Moody's Sweden SEB 'A' 07.04.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook A1
172 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 22.02.2001 Confirmation No outlook Aa3
173 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 19.09.2001 Confirmation Stable outlook Aa3
174 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 15.04.2004 Affirmation Positive outlook Aa3
175 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 02.06.2006 Affirmation Stable outlook Aa3
176 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 24.02.2007 Upgrade No outlook Aa3
177 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 18.01.2008 Watch update Negative outlook Aa1
178 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 27.06.2008 Downgrade Negative outlook Aa2
179 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 10.10.2008 Downgrade Negative outlook Aa3
180 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 27.02.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook A1
181 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 27.04.2009 Watch update Negative outlook A1
182 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 22.07.2009 Watch update Negative outlook A1
183 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 08.09.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook A2
184 Moody's Sweden SWEDBANK 'A' 22.06.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook A2
186 Moody's Sweden Svenska handelsbanken 20.12.2000 Confirmation Stable outlook Aa2
187 Moody's Sweden Svenska handelsbanken 02.06.2003 Affirmation Positive outlook Aa2
188 Moody's Sweden Svenska handelsbanken 16.03.2004 Upgrade Stable outlook Aa1
189 Moody's Sweden Svenska handelsbanken 22.07.2009 Watch update Negative outlook Aa1
190 Moody's Sweden Svenska handelsbanken 08.09.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook Aa2
191 Moody's Sweden Atlas Copco AB 02.11.2000 Confirmation Negative outlook A3
192 Moody's Sweden Atlas Copco AB 10.06.2003 Affirmation Stable outlook A3
193 Moody's Sweden Atlas Copco AB 05.02.2007 Affirmation Stable outlook A3
194 Moody's Sweden SKF 'B' 29.03.2001 Upgrade Stable outlook Baa1
195 Moody's Sweden SKF 'B' 03.05.2002 Confirmation Positive outlook Baa1
196 Moody's Sweden SKF 'B' 14.03.2003 Watch update Positive outlook Baa1
197 Moody's Sweden SKF 'B' 13.05.2003 Upgrade Stable outlook A3
198 Moody's Sweden SKF 'B' 25.02.2009 Affirmation Negative outlook A3
199 Moody's Sweden SKF 'B' 21.10.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook A3
200 Moody's Sweden VOLVO 'B' 18.10.2005 New Stable outlook A3
201 Moody's Sweden VOLVO 'B' 09.01.2009 Watch update Negative outlook A3
202 Moody's Sweden VOLVO 'B' 13.02.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook Baa1
203 Moody's Sweden VOLVO 'B' 30.04.2009 Affirmation Negative outlook Baa1
204 Moody's Sweden VOLVO 'B' 24.07.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook Baa2
205 Moody's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 31.05.2000 Confirmation Stable outlook A3
206 Moody's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 22.01.2001 Confirmation Stable outlook A3
207 Moody's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 20.02.2002 Affirmation Stable outlook A3
208 Moody's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 03.12.2003 Affirmation Stable outlook A3
209 Moody's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 03.02.2005 Watch update Negative outlook A3
210 Moody's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 22.03.2005 Confirmation Negative outlook A3
211 Moody's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 17.11.2005 Downgrade Negative outlook Baa1
212 Moody's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 09.11.2007 Affirmation Stable outlook Baa1
213 Moody's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 30.10.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook Baa1
214 Moody's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 29.10.2009 Affirmation Stable outlook Baa1
215 Moody's Sweden TELIASONERA 08.01.2003 Downgrade Negative outlook A2
216 Moody's Sweden TELIASONERA 24.05.2004 Affirmation Positive outlook A2
217 Moody's Sweden TELIASONERA 30.03.2005 Affirmation Stable outlook A2
218 Moody's Sweden TELIASONERA 23.06.2005 Affirmation Stable outlook A2
219 Moody's Sweden TELIASONERA 31.10.2006 Affirmation Negative outlook A2
220 Moody's Sweden TELIASONERA 30.10.2007 Downgrade Stable outlook A3
221 Moody's Sweden SAS 05.03.2004 Watch update Negative outlook Baa3
222 Moody's Sweden SAS 27.05.2004 Downgrade Stable outlook B1
223 Moody's Sweden SAS 12.08.2004 Affirmation Negative outlook B1
224 Moody's Sweden SAS 25.01.2005 Watch update Negative outlook B1
225 Moody's Sweden SAS 25.05.2005 Downgrade Negative outlook B2
226 Moody's Sweden SAS 23.06.2005 Upgrade No outlook B1
227 Moody's Sweden SAS 24.06.2008 Affirmation Stable outlook B1
228 Moody's Sweden SAS 07.11.2008 Downgrade Negative outlook B2
229 Moody's Sweden SAS 17.08.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook B3
230 Moody's Sweden SAS 12.11.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook Caa1
231 Moody's Sweden SAS 11.02.2010 Watch update Negative outlook Caa1
232 Moody's Sweden SAS 12.05.2010 Confirmation Stable outlook Caa1
233 Standar&Poor's Sweden ASSA ABLOY 'B' 15.12.2010 Watch update Negative outlook A-
234 Standar&Poor's Sweden ASSA ABLOY 'B' 18.02.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook A-
235 Standar&Poor's Sweden ASSA ABLOY 'B' 27.01.2009 Affirmation Negative outlook A-
236 Standar&Poor's Sweden ASSA ABLOY 'B' 21.09.2001 New Stable outlook A-
237 Standar&Poor's Sweden AUTOLIV SDB 27.07.2010 Upgrade Stable outlook BBB+
238 Standar&Poor's Sweden AUTOLIV SDB 26.11.2009 Upgrade Stable outlook BBB
239 Standar&Poor's Sweden AUTOLIV SDB 25.03.2009 Affirmation Stable outlook BBB-
240 Standar&Poor's Sweden AUTOLIV SDB 19.02.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook BBB-
241 Standar&Poor's Sweden AUTOLIV SDB 21.11.2008 Downgrade Negative outlook BBB+
242 Standar&Poor's Sweden AUTOLIV SDB 01.08.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook A-
243 Standar&Poor's Sweden AUTOLIV SDB 12.08.2005 Upgrade Stable outlook A-
244 Standar&Poor's Sweden AUTOLIV SDB 06.06.2000 New Stable outlook BBB+
245 Standar&Poor's Denmark DANSKE BANK 18.12.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook A
246 Standar&Poor's Denmark DANSKE BANK 05.02.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook A+
247 Standar&Poor's Denmark DANSKE BANK 22.10.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook AA-
248 Standar&Poor's Denmark DANSKE BANK 29.06.2001 Upgrade Stable outlook AA-
249 Standar&Poor's Norway DNB 18.12.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook A+
250 Standar&Poor's Norway DNB 30.01.2009 Affirmation Negative outlook AA-
251 Standar&Poor's Norway DNB 14.04.2008 Upgrade Stable outlook AA-
252 Standar&Poor's Norway DNB 30.03.2007 Affirmation Positive outlook A+
253 Standar&Poor's Sweden ELECTROLUX 'B' 09.11.2010 Upgrade Stable outlook BBB+
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254 Standar&Poor's Sweden ELECTROLUX 'B' 17.12.2008 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB
255 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 03.03.2009 Affirmation Stable outlook BBB+
256 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 27.11.2007 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB+
257 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 15.06.2007 Upgrade Stable outlook BBB+
258 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 01.06.2007 Watch update Positive outlook BBB-
259 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 29.08.2006 Affirmation Positive outlook BBB-
260 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 26.10.2005 Affirmation Stable outlook BBB-
261 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 28.02.2005 Upgrade Positive outlook BBB-
262 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 10.11.2004 Upgrade Positive outlook BB+
263 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 03.08.2004 Affirmation Stable outlook BB
264 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 07.11.2002 Downgrade Negative outlook BB
265 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 01.08.2002 Downgrade Negative outlook BB+
266 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 22.07.2002 Downgrade Negative outlook BBB-
267 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 16.05.2002 Downgrade Negative outlook BBB
268 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 23.04.2002 Watch update Negative outlook BBB+
269 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 13.11.2001 Downgrade Negative outlook BBB+
270 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 14.05.2001 Downgrade Negative outlook A-
271 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 13.03.2001 Watch update Negative outlook A
272 Standar&Poor's Sweden ERICSSON 'B' 30.01.2001 Downgrade Negative outlook A
273 Standar&Poor's Sweden HOLMEN 'B' 15.12.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook BBB
274 Standar&Poor's Sweden HOLMEN 'B' 17.02.2010 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB
275 Standar&Poor's Sweden HOLMEN 'B' 09.12.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB
276 Standar&Poor's Sweden INDUSTRIVARDEN 'C' 21.11.2008 Downgrade Negative outlook A
277 Standar&Poor's Sweden INDUSTRIVARDEN 'C' 17.05.2000 New Stable outlook A+
278 Standar&Poor's Denmark JYSKE BANK 20.02.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook A
279 Standar&Poor's Denmark JYSKE BANK 30.09.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook A+
280 Standar&Poor's Denmark JYSKE BANK 04.06.2007 Upgrade Stable outlook A+
281 Standar&Poor's Denmark JYSKE BANK 02.05.2006 New Positive outlook A
282 Standar&Poor's Sweden LUNDBERGFORETAGEN 'B' 08.06.2007 Upgrade Stable outlook A+
283 Standar&Poor's Sweden LUNDBERGFORETAGEN 'B' 24.01.2001 New Stable outlook A
284 Standar&Poor's Sweden NORDEA BANK 29.11.2005 Upgrade Stable outlook AA-
285 Standar&Poor's Sweden NORDEA BANK 09.11.2004 Affirmation Positive outlook A+
286 Standar&Poor's Sweden NORDEA BANK 01.03.2004 New Stable outlook A+
287 Standar&Poor's Denmark NORDEA BANK (CSE) 29.11.2005 Upgrade Stable outlook AA-
288 Standar&Poor's Denmark NORDEA BANK (CSE) 09.11.2004 Affirmation Positive outlook A+
289 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSK HYDRO 19.11.2010 Upgrade Stable outlook BBB
290 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSK HYDRO 06.05.2010 Watch update Positive outlook BBB-
291 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSK HYDRO 20.03.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook BBB-
292 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSK HYDRO 20.01.2009 Watch update Negative outlook BBB
293 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSK HYDRO 03.08.2007 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB
294 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSK HYDRO 18.12.2006 Watch update Negative outlook A-
295 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSK HYDRO 02.06.2006 Downgrade Stable outlook A-
296 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 12.08.2010 Downgrade Negative outlook B-
297 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 17.02.2010 Downgrade Negative outlook B
298 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 19.05.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook B+
299 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 23.09.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook BB-
300 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 21.04.2008 Downgrade Negative outlook BB-
301 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 28.01.2008 Downgrade Negative outlook BB
302 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 22.10.2007 Affirmation Negative outlook BB+
303 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 14.11.2006 Downgrade Stable outlook BB+
304 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 20.10.2006 Watch update Negative outlook BBB-
305 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 21.03.2006 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB-
306 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 08.04.2004 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB-
307 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 18.03.2004 Watch update Negative outlook BBB
308 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 25.03.2003 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB
309 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 05.02.2003 Watch update Negative outlook BBB
310 Standar&Poor's Norway NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 12.10.2001 New Stable outlook BBB
311 Standar&Poor's Denmark NOVO NORDISK 'B' 13.06.2007 Upgrade Stable outlook A
312 Standar&Poor's Denmark NOVO NORDISK 'B' 29.04.2004 New Positive outlook A-
313 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 02.12.2010 Upgrade Stable outlook BB
314 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 12.02.2010 Affirmation Positive outlook BB-
315 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 10.07.2006 Upgrade Stable outlook BB-
316 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 31.03.2006 Watch update Uncertain outlook B+
317 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 06.05.2005 New Stable outlook B+
318 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 30.07.2003 Downgrade No outlook D
319 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 30.12.2002 Downgrade Negative outlook CC
320 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 20.11.2002 Downgrade Negative outlook CCC+
321 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 29.10.2002 Downgrade Negative outlook B
322 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 26.09.2002 Watch update Uncertain outlook BB-
323 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 31.07.2002 Downgrade Negative outlook BB-
324 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 03.05.2002 Watch update Negative outlook BBB-
325 Standar&Poor's Norway PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 19.01.2001 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB-
326 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 17.11.2010 Upgrade Stable outlook BB
327 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 28.04.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook BB-
328 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 26.03.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook BB-
329 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 05.12.2008 Downgrade Negative outlook BB
330 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 07.11.2008 Watch update Negative outlook BB+
331 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 03.04.2008 Downgrade Stable outlook BB+
332 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 03.11.2006 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB-
333 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 31.08.2006 Watch update Negative outlook BBB-
334 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 12.01.2006 Upgrade Stable outlook BBB-
335 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 09.11.2005 Watch update Positive outlook BB+
336 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 02.02.2005 Affirmation Positive outlook BB+
337 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 04.03.2004 Affirmation Stable outlook BB+
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338 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 20.11.2001 Watch update Positive outlook BB+
339 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 19.09.2001 Upgrade Negative outlook BB+
340 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 13.07.2001 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB-
341 Standar&Poor's Norway ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 22.01.2001 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB-
342 Standar&Poor's Sweden SANDVIK 09.03.2010 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB
343 Standar&Poor's Sweden SANDVIK 12.01.2010 Watch update Negative outlook A-
344 Standar&Poor's Sweden SANDVIK 04.06.2009 Affirmation Negative outlook A-
345 Standar&Poor's Sweden SANDVIK 02.03.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook A-
346 Standar&Poor's Sweden SANDVIK 12.02.2009 Watch update Negative outlook A
347 Standar&Poor's Sweden SANDVIK 11.11.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook A
348 Standar&Poor's Sweden SANDVIK 20.05.2008 Downgrade Stable outlook A
349 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 16.12.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook B-
350 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 06.11.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook B-
351 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 13.08.2009 Affirmation Negative outlook B
352 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 06.05.2009 Affirmation Stable outlook B
353 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 03.02.2009 Watch update Positive outlook B
354 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 06.11.2008 Downgrade Developing B
355 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 15.09.2008 Affirmation Developing BB-
356 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 21.08.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook BB-
357 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 22.07.2008 Downgrade Stable outlook BB-
358 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 30.04.2008 Watch update Negative outlook BB
359 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 30.10.2007 Affirmation Negative outlook BB
360 Standar&Poor's Sweden SAS 04.09.2007 New Stable outlook BB
361 Standar&Poor's Sweden SCANIA 'B' 31.08.2009 Affirmation Negative outlook A-
362 Standar&Poor's Sweden SCANIA 'B' 08.05.2009 Watch update Negative outlook A-
363 Standar&Poor's Sweden SCANIA 'B' 25.07.2007 Affirmation Stable outlook A-
364 Standar&Poor's Sweden SCANIA 'B' 14.09.2006 Watch update Negative outlook A-
365 Standar&Poor's Sweden SCANIA 'B' 01.06.2004 Affirmation Stable outlook A-
366 Standar&Poor's Sweden SCANIA 'B' 29.10.2001 New Developing A-
367 Standar&Poor's Sweden SECURITAS 'B' 25.10.2000 New Stable outlook BBB+
368 Standar&Poor's Sweden SEB 'A' 23.02.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook A
369 Standar&Poor's Sweden SEB 'A' 31.03.2009 Affirmation Negative outlook A
370 Standar&Poor's Sweden SEB 'A' 05.02.2009 Downgrade Stable outlook A
371 Standar&Poor's Sweden SEB 'A' 10.10.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook A+
372 Standar&Poor's Sweden SEB 'A' 17.10.2006 Upgrade Stable outlook A+
373 Standar&Poor's Sweden SEB 'A' 11.10.2005 Affirmation Positive outlook A
374 Standar&Poor's Sweden SEB 'A' 16.12.2003 Upgrade Stable outlook A
375 Standar&Poor's Sweden SKF 'B' 12.05.2003 Upgrade Stable outlook A-
376 Standar&Poor's Sweden SSAB 'A' 06.12.2010 Downgrade Stable outlook BB+
377 Standar&Poor's Sweden SSAB 'A' 12.11.2010 Watch update Negative outlook BBB-
378 Standar&Poor's Sweden SSAB 'A' 30.07.2009 Downgrade Negative outlook BBB-
379 Standar&Poor's Sweden SSAB 'A' 23.01.2009 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB
380 Standar&Poor's Sweden SSAB 'A' 17.03.2008 Affirmation Stable outlook BBB
381 Standar&Poor's Sweden SSAB 'A' 19.07.2007 Downgrade Negative outlook BBB
382 Standar&Poor's Sweden SSAB 'A' 04.05.2007 Watch update Negative outlook BBB+
383 Standar&Poor's Sweden SSAB 'A' 31.03.2000 New Stable outlook BBB+
384 Standar&Poor's Norway STATOIL 03.08.2007 Upgrade Stable outlook AA-
385 Standar&Poor's Norway STATOIL 18.12.2006 Watch update Positive outlook A+
386 Standar&Poor's Norway STATOIL 08.11.2006 Upgrade Stable outlook A+
387 Standar&Poor's Norway STATOIL 19.04.2004 Affirmation Stable outlook A
388 Standar&Poor's Norway STATOIL 24.06.2003 Affirmation Negative outlook A
389 Standar&Poor's Norway STATOIL 19.06.2001 Downgrade Stable outlook A
390 Standar&Poor's Norway STATOIL 15.11.2000 Watch update Negative outlook AA-
391 Standar&Poor's Norway STOREBRAND 15.12.2008 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB
392 Standar&Poor's Norway STOREBRAND 03.09.2007 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB+
393 Standar&Poor's Norway STOREBRAND 27.05.2005 Upgrade Stable outlook BBB+
394 Standar&Poor's Norway STOREBRAND 08.02.2005 Upgrade Stable outlook BBB
395 Standar&Poor's Norway STOREBRAND 12.02.2004 Affirmation Positive outlook BBB-
396 Standar&Poor's Norway STOREBRAND 21.08.2002 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB-
397 Standar&Poor's Norway STOREBRAND 30.07.2002 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB
398 Standar&Poor's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 27.09.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook BBB+
399 Standar&Poor's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 29.10.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB+
400 Standar&Poor's Sweden Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 17.10.2006 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB+
401 Standar&Poor's Sweden Svenska handelsbanken 11.11.2004 Upgrade Stable outlook AA-
402 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 15.12.2010 Upgrade Stable outlook BBB
403 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 20.09.2010 Watch update Positive outlook BB
404 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 14.06.2010 Upgrade Positive outlook BB
405 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 26.11.2009 Affirmation Positive outlook BB-
406 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 11.04.2006 Downgrade Stable outlook BB-
407 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 26.01.2006 Downgrade Negative outlook BB
408 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 06.10.2005 Watch update Negative outlook BBB+
409 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 13.03.2003 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB+
410 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 09.01.2003 Affirmation Negative outlook A-
411 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 19.03.2002 Downgrade Stable outlook A-
412 Standar&Poor's Denmark TDC 23.02.2001 Downgrade Stable outlook A
413 Standar&Poor's Norway TELENOR 12.04.2010 Affirmation Negative outlook A-
414 Standar&Poor's Norway TELENOR 10.02.2010 Watch update Negative outlook A-
415 Standar&Poor's Norway TELENOR 30.06.2009 Upgrade Negative outlook A-
416 Standar&Poor's Norway TELENOR 30.10.2008 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB+
417 Standar&Poor's Norway TELENOR 01.08.2006 Downgrade Stable outlook BBB+
418 Standar&Poor's Norway TELENOR 01.11.2005 Affirmation Negative outlook A-
419 Standar&Poor's Sweden TELIASONERA 28.10.2005 Downgrade Stable outlook A-
420 Standar&Poor's Sweden TELIASONERA 01.06.2005 Affirmation Negative outlook A
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Appendix 6.2.A F-test of equal variances between Moody’s and S&P. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table&6.2&
F-test for equal variances Pre announcement window t=-10 to t=-1 Inital window t=0 to t=1 Short term window t=0 to t=5
Downgrades: Moody's vs S&P Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0240 Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0033 Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0131
Sd(S&P)^2 0,0232 Sd(S&P)^2 0,0300 Sd(S&P)^2 0,0388
F-stat 1,0345 F-stat 8,9758 F-stat 2,9627
Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V1 35 V1 55 V1 55
V2 55 V2 35 V2 35
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 1,836 0,99 1,936 0,99 1,936
0,95 1,5343 0,95 1,5943 0,95 1,5943
Conclusion:
Upgrades: Moody's vs S&P Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0014 Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0005 Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0011
Sd(S&P)^2 0,0029 Sd(S&P)^2 0,0007 Sd(S&P)^2 0,0013
F-stat 1,9863 F-stat 1,3141 F-stat 1,1727
Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V2 19 V2 19 V2 19
V1 30 V1 30 V1 30
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 2,844 0,99 2,844 0,99 2,844
0,95 2,0712 0,95 2,0712 0,95 2,0712
Conclusion:
Negative Credit Watch: Moody's vs S&P Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0088 Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0042 Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0048
Sd(S&P)^2 0,0081 Sd(S&P)^2 0,0040 Sd(S&P)^2 0,0055
F-stat 1,0848 F-stat 1,0585 F-stat 1,1387
Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V1 22 V1 22 V1 22
V2 22 V2 22 V2 22
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 2,827 0,99 2,827 0,99 2,827
0,95 2,0707 0,95 2,0707 0,95 2,0707
Conclusion:
Unequal sample size and equal varianceUnequal sample size and equal variance
Equal variance and sample size Equal variance and sample size
Unequal sample size and equal variance Unequal sample size and unequal variance Unequal sample size and unequal variance
Equal variance and sample size
Unequal sample size and equal variance
421 Standar&Poor's Sweden TELIASONERA 25.03.2005 Watch update Negative outlook A
422 Standar&Poor's Sweden TELIASONERA 23.05.2003 Affirmation Stable outlook A
423 Standar&Poor's Sweden TELIASONERA 05.02.2003 New Negative outlook A
424 Standar&Poor's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 16.11.2010 Affirmation Stable outlook BBB
425 Standar&Poor's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 15.03.2010 Affirmation Negative outlook BBB
426 Standar&Poor's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 15.02.2010 Watch update Negative outlook BBB
427 Standar&Poor's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 04.10.2007 Downgrade Negative outlook BBB
428 Standar&Poor's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 25.05.2007 Watch update Negative outlook BBB+
429 Standar&Poor's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 20.12.2005 Upgrade Stable outlook BBB+
430 Standar&Poor's Norway YARA INTERNATIONAL 30.11.2004 New Stable outlook BBB
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Appendix 6.2.B. F-test of equal variances between high and low debt to equity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-test for equal variances Pre announcement window t=-10 to t=-1 Inital window t=0 to t=1 Short term window t=0 to t=5
Downgrades: D/E < 1 vs D/E > 1 S (D/E<1)^2 0,0096 S (D/E<1)^2 0,0016 S (D/E<1)^2 0,0044
S (D/E>1)^2 0,0394 S (D/E>1)^2 0,0391 S (D/E>1)^2 0,0539
F-stat 4,1238 F-stat 23,8898 F-stat 12,2828
Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V2 49 V2 49 V2 49
V1 41 V1 41 V1 41
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 2,114 0,99 2,114 0,99 2,114
0,95 1,6928 0,95 1,6928 0,95 1,6928
Conclusion:
Upgrades: D/E < 1 vs D/E > 1 Su<^2 0,0025 Su<^2 0,0005 Su<^2 0,0010
Su>^2 0,0020 Su>^2 0,0012 Su>^2 0,0019
F-stat 1,2358 F-stat 2,4384 F-stat 1,8049
Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V2 12 V1 12 V1 12
V1 34 V2 34 V2 34
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 3,701 0,99 2,843 0,99 2,843
0,95 2,4663 0,95 2,0921 0,95 2,0921
Conclusion:
Negative Credit Watches: D/E < 1 vs D/E > 1 S (D/E<1)^2 0,0080 S (D/E<1)^2 0,0067 S (D/E<1)^2 0,0065
S (D/E>1)^2 0,0084 S (D/E>1)^2 0,0011 S (D/E>1)^2 0,0033
F-stat 1,0498 F-stat 5,9608 F-stat 1,9473
Degrees of freedom: Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V2 19 V1 24 V1 24
V1 24 V2 19 V2 19
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 2,47 0,99 2,386 0,99 2,386
0,95 1,8842 0,95 1,8409 0,95 1,8409
Conclusion:
Unequal sample size and unequal variance
Unequal sample size and equal variance
Unequal sample size and equal variance
Unequal sample size and unequal variance Unequal sample size and unequal variance
Unequal sample size and equal variance Unequal sample size and equal variance
Unequal sample size and unequal varianceUnequal sample size and equal variance
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Appendix 6.2.C. F-test of equal variances between high and low beta values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-test for equal variances Pre announcement window t=-10 to t=-1 Inital window t=0 to t=1 Short term window t=0 to t=5
Downgrades: High vs low beta Sd(high beta)^2 0,0107 Sd(high beta)^2 0,0476 Sd(high beta)^2 0,0649
Sd(Low beta)^2 0,0452 Sd(Low beta)^2 0,0020 Sd(Low beta)^2 0,0062
F-stat 4,2255 F-stat 23,9335 F-stat 10,4100
Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V1 30 V1 30 V1 30
V2 30 V2 30 V2 30
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 2,386 0,99 2,386 0,99 2,386
0,95 1,8409 0,95 1,8409 0,95 1,8409
Conclusion:
Upgrades: High vs low beta Sd(high beta)^2 0,0017 Sd(high beta)^2 0,0004 Sd(high beta)^2 0,0007
Sd(Low beta)^2 0,0027 Sd(Low beta)^2 0,0006 Sd(Low beta)^2 0,0014
F-stat 1,5301 F-stat 1,3911 F-stat 2,1596
Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V2 16 V2 16 V2 16
V1 16 V1 16 V1 16
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 3,409 0,99 3,409 0,99 3,409
0,95 2,3522 0,95 2,3522 0,95 2,3522
Conclusion:
Negative Credit Watch: High vs low beta Sd(high beta)^2 0,0072 Sd(high beta)^2 0,0040 Sd(high beta)^2 0,0072
Sd(Low beta)^2 0,0148 Sd(Low beta)^2 0,0070 Sd(Low beta)^2 0,0055
F-stat 2,0667 F-stat 1,7585 F-stat 1,2954
Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V1 14 V1 14 V1 14
V2 14 V2 14 V2 14
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 3,656 0,99 3,656 0,99 3,656
0,95 2,463 0,95 2,463 0,95 2,463
Conclusion: Equal variance and sample size
Equal sample size and unequal variance Equal sample size and unequal variance Equal sample size and unequal variance
Equal variance and sample size Equal variance and sample size Equal variance and sample size
Equal variance and sample size Equal variance and sample size
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Appendix 6.2.D: Comparison of developing ACAR’s between rating provided by 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. 
 
Figure 6.2.D1  
 
Figure 6.2.D2 
Figure 6.2.D3  
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Appendix 6.2.E: Comparison of developing ACAR’s between companies with high 
and low debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
Figure 6.2.E1 
Figure 6.2.E2 
 Figure 6.2.E3 
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Appendix 6.2.F: Comparison of developing ACAR’s between companies with high 
and low beta values. 
 
Figure 6.2.F1 
 
Figure 6.2.F2 
Figure 6.2.F3 
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Appendix 6.3.1. Developing of ACAR surrounding a credit rating update.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!4,00% %
!3,00% %
!2,00% %
!1,00% %
0,00% %
1,00% %
2,00% %
3,00% %
t=
!1
0%
t=
!9
%
t=
!8
%
t=
!7
%
t=
!6
%
t=
!5
%
t=
!4
%
t=
!3
%
t=
!2
%
t=
!1
%
t=
0%
t=
1%
t=
2%
t=
3%
t=
4%
t=
5%
t=
6%
t=
7%
t=
8%
t=
9%
t=
10
%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
)c
ha
ng
e)
Downgrades))
Previous)Nega4ve)Outlook)
Average%CAR%%
Average%AR%
!7,00% %
!6,00% %
!5,00% %
!4,00% %
!3,00% %
!2,00% %
!1,00% %
0,00% %
1,00% %
2,00% %
t=
!1
0%
t=
!9
%
t=
!8
%
t=
!7
%
t=
!6
%
t=
!5
%
t=
!4
%
t=
!3
%
t=
!2
%
t=
!1
%
t=
0%
t=
1%
t=
2%
t=
3%
t=
4%
t=
5%
t=
6%
t=
7%
t=
8%
t=
9%
t=
10
%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
)c
ha
ng
e)
Downgrades))
Previous)Nega4ve)Credit)Watch)
Average%CAR%%
Average%AR%
!4,50&%&
!4,00&%&
!3,50&%&
!3,00&%&
!2,50&%&
!2,00&%&
!1,50&%&
!1,00&%&
!0,50&%&
0,00&%&
0,50&%&
1,00&%&
t=
!1
0&
t=
!9
&
t=
!8
&
t=
!7
&
t=
!6
&
t=
!5
&
t=
!4
&
t=
!3
&
t=
!2
&
t=
!1
&
t=
0&
t=
1&
t=
2&
t=
3&
t=
4&
t=
5&
t=
6&
t=
7&
t=
8&
t=
9&
t=
10
&
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
)c
ha
ng
e)
Upgrades))
Previous)Posi3ve)Outlook)
Average&CAR&&
Average&AR&
!5,00% %
!4,00% %
!3,00% %
!2,00% %
!1,00% %
0,00% %
1,00% %
t=
!1
0%
t=
!9
%
t=
!8
%
t=
!7
%
t=
!6
%
t=
!5
%
t=
!4
%
t=
!3
%
t=
!2
%
t=
!1
%
t=
0%
t=
1%
t=
2%
t=
3%
t=
4%
t=
5%
t=
6%
t=
7%
t=
8%
t=
9%
t=
10
%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
)c
ha
ng
e)
Upgrades))
Previous)Posi3ve)Credit)Watch)
Average%CAR%%
Average%AR%
GRA19003 Master thesis                     03.09.2012 
Page 62 
Appendix 7.1. Distribution of ACAR plots of initial event windows: 
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Appendix 7.2 Critical values for identifying outliers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
Appendix 7.3. Detected contaminating news in our Downgrade sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.2 
Trading days Lower critical values Upper critical values
-10 -0,1469 0,1682
-9 -0,2114 0,1238
-8 -0,1268 0,1836
-7 -0,0997 0,1556
-6 -0,1900 0,2055
-5 -0,1821 0,1552
-4 -0,1617 0,1283
-3 -0,1374 0,1818
-2 -0,1900 0,1996
-1 -0,1694 0,1730
0 -0,3637 0,1486
1 -0,2007 0,1974
2 -0,1845 0,1485
3 -0,1380 0,1809
4 -0,1971 0,0988
5 -0,1902 0,1506
6 -0,2044 0,0961
7 -0,1170 0,1148
8 -0,1261 0,1307
9 -0,1603 0,1642
10 -0,1597 0,1725
Downgrades
Table 7.3
Company Announcement date Reason for exclution Day in event window
Petroleum)Geo)Services) 31.)juli)2002 Termination)of)merger)plan)bewteen)Veritas)DGC)Inc. t=0)and)t=)2
and)Petroleum)Geo)Services
TDC 11.)april)2006 New)highly)leveraged)capital)structure)following t=)H5
its)LBO.)
TDC 13.)april)2006 New)highly)leveraged)capital)structure)following t=)H3
its)LBO.)
SAS 22.)juli)2008 Jump)in)share)price)due)to)falling)oil)price.) t=1
GRA19003 Master thesis                     03.09.2012 
Page 64 
Appendix 7.4.A F-test of equal variances between Moody’s and S&P, after 
elimination of contaminating news. 
 
 
Appendix 7.4.B F-test of equal variances between high and low debt to equity, 
after elimination of contaminating news. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table&7.4.A
F-test for equal variances Pre announcement window t=-10 to t=-1 Inital window t=0 to t=1 Short term window t=0 to t=5
Downgrades: Moody's vs S&P Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0096 Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0033 Sd(Moody's)^2 0,0131
Sd(S&P)^2 0,0133 Sd(S&P)^2 0,0046 Sd(S&P)^2 0,0062
F-stat 1,3858 F-stat 1,3661 F-stat 2,1077
Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V1 35 V1 55 V1 55
V2 55 V2 35 V2 35
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 1,836 0,99 1,936 0,99 1,936
0,95 1,5343 0,95 1,5943 0,95 1,5943
Conclusion: Unequal sample size and unequal varianceUnequal sample size and equal variance Unequal sample size and equal variance
Table&7.4.B
F-test for equal variances Pre announcement window t=-10 to t=-1 Inital window t=0 to t=1 Short term window t=0 to t=5
Downgrades: D/E < 1 vs D/E > 1 S (D/E<1)^2 0,0096 S (D/E<1)^2 0,0016 S (D/E<1)^2 0,0044
S (D/E>1)^2 0,0142 S (D/E>1)^2 0,0063 S (D/E>1)^2 0,0131
F-stat 1,4831 F-stat 3,8553 F-stat 2,9800
Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom Degrees of freedom
V2 49 V2 49 V2 49
V1 41 V1 41 V1 41
Critical values: Critical values: Critical values:
0,99 2,114 0,99 2,114 0,99 2,114
0,95 1,6928 0,95 1,6928 0,95 1,6928
Conclusion: Unequal sample size and equal variance Unequal sample size and unequal variance Unequal sample size and unequal variance
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